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NOTE
Trade Dress Protection of Product Designs: Stifling
the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts for an
Unlimited Time
Trade dress protection of product designs is anticompetitive,
unconstitutional, and poor public policy. Trade dress originally
encompassed only the packaging and labeling of a product. Under
unfair competition law, firms were prohibited from falsely packag-
ing and labeling their products in order to pass them off as the
products of another. However, over the last twenty years, federal
courts have broadened the concept of trade dress to include the
shape and design of the product itself. Courts have recently re-
laxed the standards for trade dress protection and, consequently,
expanded the protection of product designs as trade dress. In
doing so, federal courts have pioneered a new form of intellectual
property in product designs. Armed with trade dress rights, a firm
may prevent competitors from marketing products with similar
designs. Federal courts have thus created a powerful form of intel-
lectual property that requires little or no standards for protection,
affords monopoly rights, lasts forever, and eliminates rightful com-
petition.
Although courts protect product designs as trade dress under
the guise of preventing consumer confusion, many opinions reveal
a belief that competition through imitation is inherently wrong. In
what one commentator describes as a "fear and loathing of copy-
cats,"' courts have protected product designs from "pirates," "un-
scrupulous competitors," "rip-off artists," and "average thieves."
By focusing on the ethics of copying, courts have ignored the
procompetitive aspects of imitation. Imitators increase the supply
of popular products and provide consumers with goods at compet-
itive prices. Imitators may also supply aesthetically compatible
products or replacement products. In sum, imitators break a firm's
monopoly hold on a particular market. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that, in the absence of a patent or
1 See Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Propen'y Law and the Economics of Preemption, 76
IOWA L. REv. 959, 982 (1991).
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copyright, products may be freely copied. A free economy depends
on competition through imitation.
In addition, the Patent Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion mandates that Congress grant monopolies only to inventions
or designs that meet specific standards of patentability and then
only for limited times. Federal courts grant the equivalent of de-
sign patent protection when protecting product designs as trade
dress. However, designs qualifying for trade dress protection need
not meet the standards of patentability required for a design pat-
ent and this protection can potentially last forever.
Lower federal courts have ignored clear Supreme Court hold-
ings and the Constitution to protect product designs as trade
dress. Courts grant trade dress protection to designs that cannot
qualify for patent protection, designs that are already covered by a
design patent, and designs on which a design patent has expired.
In doing so, courts protect designs that the patent laws mandate
should be in the public domain and available for copying. These
decisions clearly conflict with design patent law and the Patent
Clause of the Constitution.
In contrast to patent law's specific statutory scheme rooted in
the Constitution, trade dress rights have evolved from the com-
mon law of unfair competition. Accordingly, the standards for
trade dress protection are uncertain and vary from court to court.
Courts have developed various multi-factor tests that make trade
dress rights utterly unpredictable. In contrast to patent law's statu-
tory scheme for resolving priority disputes and issuing patents,
competitors have no way to know if and when a firm acquires
trade dress rights. Trade dress protection of product designs is the
antithesis of national uniformity and certainty in intellectual prop-
erty rights.
Part I of this Note compares design patent law with trade
dress protection of product designs. Part II examines the policies
of patent law and analyzes the Supreme Court cases that have
formulated these policies. In addition, this section details the con-
flict between design patent law and trade dress protection of prod-
uct designs. Part III responds to the common arguments for the
continued validity of trade dress protection. Part IV addresses four
potential solutions to the problems with trade dress protection of
product designs. This note concludes with the proposal that no
firm should be liable for trade dress infringement of a product
design if that firm takes "every reasonable means" to prevent con-
fusion.
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I. PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS - PATENT V. TRADEMARK
A. Subject Matter Protected
Under patent law, a designer may obtain a design patent on
the "ornamental" features of a utilitarian product.2 Ornamental
features are those that contribute to the look or appearance of a
product rather than the use of the product.3 A designer may not
obtain a design patent on the functional features of a product.
Only utility patent law may protect a product's functional features.
Although individual features of a product may be functional, a
design patent may cover the overall appearance or design of a
product if the design is not "dictated by" or "essential to the use
of' the product.4 In close cases, courts look to whether the design
is primarily functional or primarily ornamental.
Similarly, under trademark and unfair competition law, a
designer may obtain protection for a product's trade dress. A
product's trade dress is the total image and overall appearance of
the product. Trade dress is an expansive concept that may include
a product's size, shape, color, packaging, and advertising materi-
al.5 Although trade dress traditionally referred to the packaging
and labeling of a product, courts have broadened the concept to
include the shape and design of the product itself.'
Like design patent protection, courts do not protect product
designs under trade dress if those designs are functional. A feature
is functional and unprotectable if it is "essential to the use or
purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the
article."' Although individual features may be functional, the over-
all appearance of a product design may be nonfunctional.8 The
purpose of the nonfunctionality requirement is to prevent a con
2 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1991) ("ornamental design for an article of manufacture").
3 See L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom MrAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993).
4 Id.
5 See J. THOMAS MCQ.SRTHY, MCCARTI ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
8.01[2] (3d ed. 1992).
6 See American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1140 (3d
Cir. 1986).
7 Inwood Lab., Inc. .. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982).
8 See L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993).
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flict between trademark/unfair competition law and utility patent
law.9
B. Authority for Protection
The Patent Clause of the United States Constitution grants
Congress the power:
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
Pursuant to this authority, Congress enacted the Patent Act."
The Patent Act provides for two primary types of patents-utility
and design patents. Utility patents cover products and processes,
2
while design patents cover ornamental designs on manufactured
products. 3
Pursuant to the Patent Act, the Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO") may grant patent rights to the first inventor of a product
design. The Patent Act requires that a potential patentee satisfy
certain standards of patentability before a patent is granted. An
inventor must submit a patent application to the PTO claiming
the invention within one year of the public use or sale of the
design. 4 If the patent applicant satisfies the standards of patent-
ability, the PTO will issue a patent on the claimed design.
In contrast to patent law's specific statutory scheme and clear
constitutional mandate, courts protect product trade dress under
the federal trademark and unfair competition statute, the Lanham
Act of 1946."5 The Lanham Act defines a trademark to include
any "word, name, symbol, or device . . . used . . . to identify and
9 See W.T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 1985) ("a defense
of functionality [heads] off a collision between section 43(a) and patent law"); Keene
Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 1981) ("The purpose of the
rule precluding trademark significance [for functional features] is to prevent the grant of
a perpetual monopoly to features which cannot be patented .... Products or features
which have not qualified for patent protection but which are functional are in the public
domain and are fair game for imitation and copying.").
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
11 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1991).
12 Id. § 101 ("process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter").
13 Id. § 171 ("ornamental design for an article of manufacture").
14 Id. § 102(b).
15 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1991). Congress enacted the Lanham Act under the
Commerce Clause's broad power grant to "regulate commerce." U.S. CONST. art I, § 8,
cl. 2.
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distinguish . . . goods . . . from those manufactured by others." 6
Courts have interpreted this definition to include the shape of the
product itself and have allowed registration of product designs as
trademarks." Before registering a trademark, the PTO reviews
trademark applications for distinctiveness, truthfulness, content,
and novelty.'8 A registered trademark may be enforced under
section 32 of the Lanham Act.'"
However, in contrast to patent rights, trade dress rights may
arise without registration or application to the PTO. A firm may
acquire rights in a product's trade dress merely through use of
that trade dress. Courts recognize unregistered trade dress under
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Section 43(a) codifies the feder-
al law of unfair competition and provides:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or servic-
es . .. uses any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof ... which . . .is likely to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake . . .as to the origin, sponsorship, or ap-
proval of his or her goods . . .shall be liable in a civil action
by any person who believes that he or she is likely to be dam-
aged by such act.
20
Although a product's trade dress may be registered under
section 32, courts most often protect unregistered trade dress
under section 43(a). Protection under either section is the same.
Courts interpret both section 43(a) and section 32 to prohibit the
marketing of similar product designs that are "likely to cause con-
fusion."2'
Although the statute says absolutely nothing about product
16 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1991). Similarly, a service mark is a mark used to identify ser-
vices. Id.
17 See e.g., Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 635-36 (7th Cir. 1993) (upholding
registration of faucet design). Registration offers several benefits. A registered trademark
becomes incontestable on the grounds of distinctiveness and anticipation after 5 years. 15
U.S.C. §§ 1064, 1065, 1115(b) (1991). Registration also provides national notice of trade-
mark rights.
18 For example, a trademark may not be deceptive, immoral, or scandalous. Id. §
1052(a). Also, a person's surname is not immediately registrable as a trademark without a
shoing of secondary meaning. Id. § 1052(c)(f). Descriptive marks are also not imme-
diately registrable. Id. Finally, a mark must not be likely to cause confusion with an earli-
er mark. Id. § 1052(d).
19 Id. § 1114.
20 Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1991).
21 See Joseph P. Bauer, Federal Law of Unfair Competition, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 671, 708
n.169 (1984) (standard of consumer confision is the same under both § 32 and §
43(a)).
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designs or copying, product designs have found protection in
section 43(a) under a variety of theories. Some courts protect
unregistered product designs as trademarks.22 Alternatively, some
courts view copying of product designs as unfair competition and
prohibited under section 43(a). Still other courts read a cause
of action for trade dress infringement into section 43(a) .24 "At-
tempts to incorporate protection for a product's overall design or
appearance into section 43(a) have come under a variety of guis-
es."
25
C. Standards for Protection
To obtain a design patent, a patent applicant must show the
design is novel and nonobvious..26  To satisfy the novelty re-
quirement, a design must not be anticipated by prior patents,
printed publications, or public use by others.2 ' An obscure publi-
cation, unknown to the inventor, may bar patentability.2 Also,
where two or more designers claim a design, the first to have
made the design generally prevails. 9 In sum, a design must be
original to qualify for patent protection.
In addition, the design must be nonobvious ° A design is
not patentable if, at the time the design was made, the design
22 See, e.g., Blau Plumbing v. S.O.S. Fix-it, 781 F.2d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1986); Keene
Corp. v. Paraflex Industries, 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981) ("design trademark").
23 See, e.g., Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1220 (8th Cir.)
(finding infringement under § 43(a) of shape of semitrailer), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861
(1976).
24 See e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1305 (9th Cir.), peti-
tion for cei. filed, (Apr. 4. 1994).
25 American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1140 n.2 (3d
Cir. 1986).
26 With the exception of the ornamentality requirement, the standards for utility
patents and design patents are the same. "The provisions of this title relating to patents
for inventions shall apply to patents for designs, except as otherwise provided." 35 U.S.C.
§ 171 (1991).
27 Id. § 102 (1991). The inventor must also show timely application for the patent
and, in the event of a priority dispute, diligence in reducing the invention to practice.
28 For an extreme example, see In re Borst, 345 F.2d 851 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (patent
claims on nuclear reactor anticipated by classified government document), cert. denied,
Borst v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 973 (1966). However, a prior publication must generally be
disclosed to the public to bar patentability.
29 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1991). An invention is "made" when it is reduced to practice.
To take priority, an inventor must have first made and not abandoned, suppressed, or
concealed the invention. In addition, an inventor can take priority by proving prior con-
ception and diligence in reducing the invention to practice. Diligence is measured from
a time prior to conception by the other party. Id.
30 Id. § 103.
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would have been obvious to a designer of ordinary skill in the
field."
A design must not only be new, it must also represent an ad-
vance over the prior designs in the field. As an aid in determining
whether a design is an advance over prior designs, courts some-
times consider if the design is a commercial success.32 This sec-
ondary consideration presumes that if an invention was obvious,
someone else would have discovered it sooner. Obvious advances
are not patentable because they do not demonstrate the skill and
ingenuity which justifies the limited monopoly of a patent.3 Simi-
larly, obvious advances are in the public domain and free for the
use of all." These standards of patentability, novelty and
nonobviousness, distinguish patentable designs from designs that
may be freely copied by all.
Courts do not require that a product design be novel or
nonobvious to be protected as trade dress. The design must
merely be capable of distinguishing the product from products
sold by others. 5 A design is capable of distinguishing the source
of the product if the design has acquired secondary meaning or,
under the modern trend in trade dress infringement cases, if the
design is inherently distinctive.
The doctrines of secondary meaning and inherent distinctive-
ness are borrowed from the distinctiveness spectrum of traditional
word trademarks. The distinctiveness spectrum includes: fanciful36
31 See L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1124 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993).
32 Id. For utility patents, the "secondary considerations" of commercial success, long
felt but unsolved need for the invention, and the fact that others have tried and failed
to make the invention, indicate nonobviousness. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.
1, 17 (1966).
33 See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1851) ("[U]nless more
ingenuity and skill ...were required ... than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic
acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity
which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement
is the work of a skillful mechanic, not that of an inventor.").
34 See Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989)
("Both the novelty and the nonobviousness requirements of federal patent law are
grounded in the notion that concepts within the public grasp, or those so obvious that
they readily could be, are the tools of creation available to all.").
35 In other words, the design must serve as a trademark. "The term 'trademark'
includes any word, name, symbol, or device ...used ... to identify and distinguish ..
. goods . . . from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of
the goods, even if that source is unknown." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1991).
36 Fanciful marks are words that are coined for the purpose of identifying a good
or service. Examples are RX-7 cars, KODAK cameras, and XEROX copiers. See MCCARTHY,
supra note 5, at § 11.03.
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or arbitrary 7 marks; suggestive marks;38 descriptive marks;39 and
generic terms.4" Arbitrary, fanciful, and suggestive marks are con-
sidered inherently distinctive and may immediately serve as a
trademark.4 ' Inherently distinctive words have little or no connec-
tion to the products they mark. Competitors, therefore, have no
need to use the words to describe their products.
Competitors may need to use descriptive marks to describe
the products they mark. Therefore, one firm may not exclusively
use a descriptive term as a trademark unless consumers associate
that term with the firm. Hence, the term then has a secondary
meaning that identifies the source of the product and the term
becomes distinctive.4" In the case of generic terms, all firms need
the generic term to adequately describe their product because the
generic term is the name of the product.
A product design acquires secondary meaning when consum-
ers associate a particular product design with a single source. 3
Courts examine several factors to determine if a design has ac-
quired secondary meaning including: 1) the length and exclusivity
of the design's use;44 2) direct testimony that consumers associate
a design with a single source;4" 3) consumer surveys;" 4) unso-
37 Arbitrary marks are words that are in common use but have no connection with
the goods they identify. Examples are SATURN cars, PIONEER stereos, and MACINTOSH
computers. Id. § 11.04.
38 Suggestive marks are words that suggest some quality of the good that they iden-
tify but require some thought to connect the mark with the product. Examples are
CHUNKY MONKEY banana/walnut ice cream, IVORY soap, LIFE cereal, and
GREYHOUND bus lines. Id. § 11.20-.23.
39 Descriptive marks are words that describe the goods or service they identify. Ex-
amples are EVERREADY batteries, SUPREME crackers, and RAISIN-BRAN cereal. Id.
11.05-.08.
40 Generic terms are words that have come to identify the product itself and there-
fore have no value in identifying the source of the product. Examples are thermos, aspi-
rin, and lite beer. Id. § 12.01-.18.
41 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1991) (allowing registration for any mark "by which the
goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others").
42 See id. § 1052(f) (allowing registration for mark "which has become distinctive").
The Lanham Act presumes distinctiveness upon five years of continuous and exclusive use
of a mark. Id.
43 See Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 449 (4th Cir. 1986) (secondary
meaning is established when "in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a
product feature or term is to identify the source of the product rather than the product
itself.").
44 "[W]hile not impossible, it is dilIicult for a product to acquire secondlary meaning
during an 18-month period." Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp., 975 F.2d 815, 826 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (finding that blender design had not acquired secondary meaning).
45 See Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1220 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
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licited media coverage of a product's design;" 5) sales success;"
and 6) advertising expenditures. 9 If these factors indicate that
consumers associate the design with a single firm, the firm may
protect the design as a trademark.
Until recently, a firm that claimed trademark rights in a prod-
uct design was required to show that the design had established
secondary meaning. Secondary meaning was established when
consumers came to associate a particular design with a single man-
ufacturer5 However, the Supreme Court recently held that trade
dress may be inherently distinctive and secondary meaning need
not be shown.5 ' The Court found that a restaurant's decorations,
exterior design, and overall atmosphere could be inherently dis-
tinctive. Because this case dealt with trade dress in general and
not product design specifically, it arguably does not apply to the
shape of a product. In fact, many courts and commentators have
stated that the shape and design of a product may never be inher-
46 See Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir.
1986)
47 See LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 78 (2d Cir. 1985).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 449 (4th Cir. 1986) (secondary
meaning is established when "in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a
product feature or term is to identify the source of the product rather than the product
itself.").
51 In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992), one
Southwestern style restaurant had copied the decorations (paintings, decorations, artifacts,
exterior neon painting, awnings, etc.) of another restaurant. At trial, a jury found thfit
the trade dress of the restaurant had not acquired secondary meaning but was inherently
distinctive. In other words, consumers did not associate the decorations with any particu-
lar restaurant, but the decorations themselves were so unique that they obviated any
need to show this association. The jury also found a likelihood of confusion and that the
decorations were nonfunctional. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the lower court's
finding of trade dress infringement based on inherent distinctiveness without a showing a
secondary meaning. Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir.
1991), aFJ'd, 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992). In contrast, the Second Circuit had previously held
that secondary meaning was required to protect a product's trade dress. Vibrant Sales,
Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299, 303 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
909 (1982).
The Supreme Court resolved the dispute in favor of the Fifth Circuit. The Court
unanimously held that a showing of secondary meaning is not required if inherent dis-
tinctiveness is shown. The Court found no difference between a standard trademark (i.e.,
a word or symbol) and trade dress that serves as a trademark. "We see no basis for re-
quiring secondary meaning for inherently distinctive trade dress under 43(a) but not for
other distinctive words, symbols, or devices capable of identifying a producer's product."
Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2760.
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ently distinctive." Regardless, most courts considering this issue
have applied the Supreme Court's holding to the shape of a prod-
uct and found that the shape could be inherently distinctive.s
Courts may therefore protect product designs absent a showing of
secondary meaning.
To determine if a product design is inherently distinctive,
courts examine whether the design is "unique or unusual in a
particular field" and not a "'common' basic shape or design. 54
Also, a court may consider whether "a buyer will immediately rely
on [a product's design] to differentiate the product from those of
competing manufacturers'." ' Accordingly, a product design may
acquire trademark status based on a court's intuitive judgment of
52 In Sicilia Di. R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 426 n.7 (5th Cir. 1984), the
Fifth Circuit found that the packaging of a product was inherently distinctive but restrict-
ed its holding to the packaging and not the shape of the product itself. "Unlike a
product's configuration, which may acquire trademark value over time and by exposure
to consumers, arbitrary and nonutilitarian trade dress or packaging usually is designed to
act immediately as an identifier of source." Id.
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that the distinctive shape of a product
does not instantly establish secondary meaning. Ferrari s.p.a. Esercizio Fabriche
Automobili E Corse v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1240 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Ferrari's vehicles
would not acquire secondary meaning merely because they are unique designs or because
they are aesthetically beautiful. The design must be one that is instantly identified in the
mind of the informed viewer as a Ferrari design."), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3028 (1992).
Some commentators recognize that the inherent distinctiveness analysis is inappro-
priate for product designs. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §16, comment
b (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1990) ("Product features are more likely to be seen merely as
utilitarian or ornamental aspects of the goods. In addition, the competitive interest in
copying product designs is more substantial than in the case of packaging, containers,
labels, and related subject matter. Prodtct designs are therefore not considered inherent-
ly distinctive; such designs are protectable only upon proof of secondary meaning.").
However, Professor McCarthy would apparently protect a product design upon a
showing of inherent distinctiveness. McCarthy notes that the source-identif)ing re-
quirement of a product's shape "could be accomplished either if the shape is so unusual
and unique as to be inherently distinctive or if not, by evidence of secondary meaning."
MCCARTHY, supra note 5, at § 7.23 n.29. In addition, McCarthy states that the Two Pesos
opinion resolved the issue and that a product shape can be inherently distinctive. Id. at
§ 8.02[3].
53 See, e.g., Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp., 975 F.2d 815, 825 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (re-
manding trade dress infringement claim on hand-held blender for deternination of in-
herent distinctiveness in absence of secondary meaning). But see Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc.,
12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993) ("The only distinction courts make between trade dress gen-
erally and product configuration cases in particular is to require plaintiffs . . . to prove
secondary meaning because a product's shape is never inherently distinctive.").
54 AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1536 (lth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1041 (1987).
55 Tone Brothers Inc. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1331
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
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the design itself. 6
More importantly, some courts discard the secondary meaning
and inherent distinctiveness requirements entirely. The Second
Circuit does not require proof of secondary meaning if intentional
copying is shown. 7 Other courts establish a rebuttable presump-
tion of secondary meaning upon proof of intentional copying?
These courts reason that a competitor would not copy another's
design unless it hoped to benefit from the good will associated
with the design.
Similarly, courts have dispensed with the requirement of sec-
ondary meaning under the doctrine of "secondary meaning in the
making."5 Under this doctrine, courts protect trade dress while
secondary meaning is being established, but before consumers
associate a product with a unique source.' The rationale of the
doctrine, similar to the presumption of secondary meaning, is to
prevent intentional copiers from capitalizing upon the efforts of
others. Most courts have rejected the doctrine of secondary mean-
ing in the making.6
D. Scope of Protection
Upon receipt of a design patent, the patentee enjoys the
exclusive right to make, use, and sell the design.' The term of a
56
To say that the overall design of a usefil article is "inherently distinctive" of a
particular source merely through examination and perhaps dissection seems to
me an impermissible exercise of intuitive judging. It substitutes an impression
that the design is outstanding, or eccentric, or clever, or something, for the
proof of association with a source, gained in the marketplace, that add up to a
showing of secondary meaning.
Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overieup, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1380 (1987).
57 See Harlequin Enters. Ltd. v. Gulf & W. Corp., 644 F.2d 946, 950 (2d Cir. 1981).
But see Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1182 n.13 (7th Cir.
1989) (refusing to presume secondary meaning); Clamp Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Enco Mfg. Co.,
870 F.2d 512, 517 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989).
58 See Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 449 (4th Cir. 1986).
59 See Jolly Good Indus., Inc. v. Elegra, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 227, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
60 See MCCARTHY supra note 5, at § 15.21.
61 The Federal Circuit, the Eighth Circuit, and the Northern District of Illinois have
expressly rejected the doctrine. Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Telecommunications Group, 900
F.2d 1546, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Black & Decker Mfg. Co. v. Ever-Ready Appliance Mfg.
Co., 684 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1982); National Presto Indus., Inc., v. Hamilton Beach, Inc.,
18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1993 (N.D. I11. 1990).
62 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1991).
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design patent is fourteen years." In a design patent application,
the design is claimed by a drawing. Written claims are normally
not required. 4 Much as metes and bounds define real property,
the drawing in a design patent application defines the invention
and determines the scope of protection. A patentee may prevent
competitors from using the patented design "or any colorable
imitation."'65
A design patent is infringed:
[I]f, in the eye of the ordinary observer, giving such attention
as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the
same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive the ordinary
observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the
other.'
Alternatively stated, a design patent is infringed if an accused
design is "substantially the same" and "one design would be confused
with the other.6
Similarly, trade dress is infringed if a similar design is "likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive."6" The primary,
and often exclusive, test for determining likelihood of confusion is
the similarity of the designs. 9 Thus, under both design patent
and trademark law, a firm may prevent competitors from using
confusingly or deceptively similar designs.
Unlike design patents, trade dress rights may last forever. A
trademark is valid as long as it is used." Moreover, unregistered
trade dress rights are not defined absent litigation. A firm will
often not know that a competitor claims trade dress rights in a
particular design until confronted with a lawsuit for trade dress
infringement.
63 Id. § 173.
64 "No description, other than a reference to the drawing, is ordinarily required
• . More than one claim is neither required nor permitted." 37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a) (1993).
65 35 U.S.C. § 289 (1991).
66 Gorham Co. v. 'White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1872).
67 See L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thon McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1124 (Fed. Cir.)
(emphasis added), rert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993).
68 Lanhain Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1991) (emphasis added).
69 "Similarity of products, however, does become actionable [under trademark law]
when the similarity leads to consumer confusion as to source and the public cares who
the source of that product is." Ferrari s.p.a. Esercizio Fabriche Automobili E Corse v.
Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1243 (6th Cir. 1991), cem. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3028 (1992).
70 Trademark registration must be renewed every ten years. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058-59
(1991). However, trade dress need not be registered to be protected under § 43(a).
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II. THE POLICIES OF PATENT LAW
A. The Origins of Patent Law
The original purpose of statutory patent law was to protect
the public from unwarranted monopolies. In England prior to
1623, the King or Queen granted patent monopolies to favored
individuals.7 The Crown often abused this power by awarding
patents for inventions that were already in the public domain.
Free competition was burdened with unnecessary patents. In re-
sponse to public outrage over this practice, Parliament, in 1623,
enacted the Statute of Monopolies which voided and prohibited all
monopolies. The statute allowed future patent monopolies only to
the "true and first inventor" of "new manufactures" for a limited
term of fourteen years.72 Thus, the Statute of Monopolies recog-
nized that standards of invention would protect the public from
unwarranted monopolies.,
The framers of the United States Constitution adopted a simi-
lar balance between free competition and government sponsored
monopoly. Originally, Thomas Jefferson opposed all forms of gov-
ernment sponsored monopoly. Jefferson argued that an individual
has no natural right to an idea or invention:
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all oth-
ers of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power
called an idea .... He who receives an idea from me, receives
instructions himself without lessening mine; as he who lights
his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. That
ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe,
for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improve-
ment of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and be-
nevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire,
expansible over all space, without lessening their density in any
point, and like the air in which we breathe .... incapable of
confinement or exclusive appropriation. Inventions then can-
not, in nature, be a subject of property.73
Jefferson recognized that the free flow of ideas and inventions
would benefit both consumers and market participants. Competi-
71 See ROBERT A. CHOATE FT AL.., CASFS AND MATERIAL ON PATENT LNW 62-68 (3d
ed. 1987).
72 Id. at 68.
73 6 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180-81 (H.A. Washington ed., 1854).
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tors would benefit from the free access to markets. Consumers
would benefit from the increased choices and lower prices result-
ing from healthy competition. Accordingly, "the benefit of even
limited monopolies is too doubtful to be opposed to that of their
general suppression."7 4
James Madison, in contrast, advocated natural rights in ideas
and inventions. Because invention was the fruit of individual labor,
the individual should reap the reward. Also, society benefited by
rewarding the inventor. Through the reward of a government
sponsored monopoly, invention was encouraged. "The right to
useful inventions . . .belong[s] to the inventors. The public good
fully coincides . . .with the claims of individuals."'75
Jefferson acquiesced, but not on a natural rights theory. Jef-
ferson eventually recognized and supported the social utility of
rewarding inventors for disclosing new inventions. Jefferson saw
the patent grant as a contract. In exchange for the exclusive right
to the profits of an invention, the patentee must provide a useful
invention to society. Before granting a monopoly, the government
must ensure that a corresponding benefit is provided to society.
This bargain is an essential element of patent law and is embod-
ied in the Patent Clause of the United States Constitution.
Although Congress is empowered to grant monopolies, it may
do so only "To promote the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts" and then only for "limited Times." Thus, the Patent Clause
is both a power grant and a limitation on Congress. Congress may
not grant patent rights to inventions or designs that do not meet
specific standards of patentability.
[Congress may not] enlarge the patent monopoly without re-
gard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained
thereby. Moreover, Congress may not authorize the issuance of
patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from
the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials al-
ready available. Innovation, advancement, and things which add
to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a
patent system which by constitutional command must "promote
the Progress of ... useful Arts.
7 6
The standards of patentability ensure that society benefits
from the grant of a patent. In order for society to benefit from a
74 5 'WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 47 (Ford ed., 1854).
75 THE FEDERAUST No. 43, at 309 (James Madison) (B. Wright ed., 1961).
76 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966).
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design or invention, it must be a new and nonobvious innovation.
An invention or design that is not new is already in the public
domain and not susceptible to private monopoly. The
nonobviousness requirement ensures that patents are not granted
for trivial or obvious advances. The novelty and nonobviousness re-
quirements are necessary, according to Thomas Jefferson, for
"drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public
the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are
not.
77
The Constitution also mandates that patent rights be limited
in duration. Upon expiration of a patent, the rights in the patent-
ed invention or design pass to the public. As the Supreme Court
stated in Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Manufacturing Co.:
The public has invested in such free use by the grant of a
monopoly to the patentee for a limited time. Hence, any at-
tempted reservation or continuation in the patentee or those
claiming under him of the patent monopoly, after the patent
expires, whatever the legal device employed, runs counter to the
policy and purpose of the patent laws.
78
B. The Conflict between Trade Dress Protection and
the Patent Clause of the Constitution
Trade dress protection of product designs conflicts with the
Patent Clause by offering patent-like protection to designs that do
not meet the standards of patentability. In addition, trade dress
rights may last forever, in violation of the "Limited Times" provi-
sion of the Patent Clause. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly
held, protection of product designs outside of patent law is uncon-
stitutional.
The Supreme Court has established the policies of patent law
in a series of decisions analyzing the conflict between the federal
patent laws and state laws. The decisions discuss whether the pat-
ent laws conflict with and therefore "preempt" the state law under
the Supremacy Clause. The Supreme Court has also addressed the
conflict between state trade dress protection and the Patent Clause
of the Constitution. The Patent Clause applies equally to state law
and common law doctrine grafted onto the federal trademark
77 Id. at 9.
78 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945) (emphasis added)
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statute.
A federal law preempts a state law if the state law "stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress. '7 9 Also, Congress may expressly
preempt state law by delineating the permissible area for state ac-
tion in a federally regulated area of law. Congress has adopted the
latter approach under the copyright laws." In contrast, the patent
laws do not contain an express provision for preemption of state
law. Preemption doctrine under the patent laws has evolved in a
series of Supreme Court decisions analyzing whether particular
state laws conflict with federal patent law. In the course of these
decisions, the Supreme Court has amplified the goals and pur-
poses of federal patent law.
In early cases, the Supreme Court did not state that federal
patent law "preempted" a conflicting common law doctrine. In-
stead, the Court spoke in terms of the public rights guaranteed by
the patent laws. Specifically, the Court found a public right in the
subject matter of expired patents. The Court then determined
whether or not the common law doctrine in question usurped this
public right.
C. Early Supreme Court Cases
In Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June Manufacturing Co.,"1 the
plaintiff, claiming unfair competition and trademark infringement,
attempted to prevent the defendant from copying the design of its
distinctive sewing machine. - The sewing machine was the subject
of expired utility patents.
The Court dismissed the complaint based on mere copying of
the machine.
It is self evident that on the expiration of a patent the monop-
oly created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the
thing formerly covered by the patent becomes public property.
It is upon this condition that the patent is granted. It follows,
as a matter of course, that on the termination of the patent
79 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). Preemption doctrine is based on the
Supremacy Clause. U.S. CONsT. art VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States . . .shall be the Supreme Law of the Land ... .
80 See 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1991).
81 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
82 The Court noted that the plaintiff failed to distinguish its trademark infringement
and unfair competition claims. Recognizing the similarities of the two doctrines, the
Court restated the plaintiff's claims as unfair competition claims. Id. at 184.
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there passes to the public the right to make the machine in
the form in which it was constructed during the patent. We
may, therefore, dismiss without further comment the complaint,
as to the form in which defendant made his machines.'
The Court recognized that the configuration of the Singer
sewing machine served as a trademark. The Court noted that the
prior patent monopoly had given the Singer machines "a distinc-
tive character and form which caused them to be known as Singer
machines, as deviating and separable from the form and character
of machines made by other manufacturers."8 4 Nonetheless, the
Court refused to recognize an exclusive right to this trademark
because, to do so, would conflict with the public's right to the
subject matter of an expired patent. However, the defendant was
required to adequately label its machines to prevent consumer
confusion as to the source of a machine.'
Similarly, in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,8" the Court
found no unfair competition where the defendant copied the
plaintiff's pillow-shaped shredded wheat bisc uit. The pillow shape
was the subject of a design patent which had been declared inval-
id one year prior to expiration.8 7 While the pillow shape was pro-
duced by patented machines, the patents on these machines had
expired. Therefore, the right to make pillow-shaped shredded
wheat biscuits "was dedicated to the public" upon expiration of
the patents.'
Two significant aspects of the pillow-shaped biscuit have weak-
ened the holding of Kellogg. First, in contrast to the Singer sewing
machine, the shape of the biscuit was "primarily associated with
the article rather than a particular producer."8 9 Since the shape
did not serve to identify the source of the biscuit, the shape could
not serve as a trademark. Second, the shape was functional be-
cause the pillow shape affected the cost and quality of the bis-
83 Id. at 185.
84 Id. at 179.
85 Id. at 204.
86 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
87 A district court declared the design patent imalid because the design had been
in use, presumably by the patentee, more than two years prior to the application for a
patent. Id. at 119 n.4. A patent applicant must apply for a patent within one year of the
public use or sale of a product. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1991).
88 Kellogg; 305 U.S. at 119-20.
89 Id. at 120. In other words, the shape lacked secondary meaning.
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cuit.9" Since the shape was not ornamental, it should not have
originally been eligible for design patent protection. These factors
have weakened the holding of Kellogg because the shape of the
biscuit was unprotectable without resort to the policies of patent
law.
In Brulotte v. Thys Co.,9 the patentee sold a patented hop
picking machine and exacted a license fee for its use. The term of
the licenses extended beyond the term of the patents on the ma-
chine. The Court refused to enforce the licenses beyond the term
of the patents. The Court reasoned that a patentee could "lever-
age" its monopoly power and "the free market visualized for the
post-expiration period would be subject to monopoly influences
that have no proper place there."92 Like unfair competition law,
contract law could not be used to extend the life of the patent."
D. Sears and Compco - The Right to Copy
In later cases, the Supreme Court more specifically examined
the conflict between federal patent law and a state law. In a series
of cases, beginning with the seminal Sears/Compco decisions and
culminating with the recent Bonito Boats decisions, the Court ana-
lyzed the purposes of the federal patent laws and whether they
preempted specific state laws.
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.' . and Compco Corp. v. Day-
Bfite Lighting, Inc.,95 two cases decided on the same day, the
Court held that an Illinois unfair competition statute could not
prevent the copying of an unpatented product.
In Sears, the plaintiff had secured both design and utility
patents on an interior pole lamp. The defendant copied the
plaintiff's lamp and sold substantially identical lamps at discount
prices. The plaintiff sued the defendant for patent infringement
and unfair competition under Illinois law.
The district court declared the patents invalid "for want of
invention." The defendant was therefore not liable for patent
90 i. at 122.
91 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
92 I. at 32.
93 See also Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945) (doctrine of
estoppel does not foreclose public rights to subject matter of expired patent; assignor of
patent, accused with infringement of assigned patent, not estopped from arguing that
allegedly infringing device is subject of expired patent).
94 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
95 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
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infringement. However, the district court found the defendant
guilty of unfair competition under the Illinois unfair competition
law. According to the court, the defendant competed unfairly by
selling lamps "identical to or confusingly similar to" the plaintiff's
lamp. 6 The Seventh Circuit affirmed because consumers were
likely to confuse the similar lamps.97
The Supreme Court reversed and held that state unfair com-
petition law could not prevent the copying of an unpatentable
product. 8 The Court likened an unpatentable article to an article
on which a patent has expired and, in doing so, expanded the
scbpe of the public rights doctrine. Just as the public has a right
to the subject matter of an expired patent, the public has a right
to unpatentable subject matter. "An unpatentable article, like an
article on which the patent has expired, is in the public domain
and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so."99
Also, the Court found that state protection of unpatentable
subject matter undermined federal patent law. The federal patent
system "promote[s] invention while at the same time preserving
free competition."' 00 States would upset this balance by "ex-
tend[ing] the life of a patent or giv[ing] a patent on an article
which lacked the level of invention required for federal patents.
To do either would run counter to the policy of Congress of
granting patents only to true inventions, and then only for a limit-
ed time." ''
The Court saw no difference between patent protection and
96 Sears, 376 U.S. at 226.
97 The Seventh Circuit did not require proof of actual confusion nor evidence that
the defendant had actively "palmed off" its lamps as those of the plaintiff. Id. at 227.
98 Id. at 231-33. The Court did not distinguish between unpatented and unpatent-
able articles and used the terms interchangeably. There is a difference because an unpat-
ented article may be patentable. The Court would later distinguish these terms in
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). See discussion infra notes 128-30
and accompanying text.
99 Id. at 231; see also Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 149 U.S. 562, 572 (1893)
("[P]laintiffs' right to the use of the [invention] expired with their patent, and the pub-
lic had the same right to make use of it as if it had never been patented.").
100 Id. at 230-31.
101 Id. at 231.
The result would be that while federal law grants only 14 or 17 years' protection
to genuine inventions, States could allow perpetual protection to articles too
lacking in novelty to merit any patent at all under federal constitutional stan-
dards. This would be too great an encroachment on the federal patent system
to be tolerated.
Id. at 232 (citations omitted).
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the prohibition on copying. Although copying could lead to con-
sumer confusion, the right to copy prevailed.
Of course there could be 'confusion' as to who had manufac-
tured these nearly identical articles. But mere inability of the
public to tell two identical articles apart is not enough to sup-
port an injunction against copying or an award of damages for
copying that which the federal patent laws permit to be cop-
ied.
102
However, as it had in earlier cases, the Court noted that a state
may require that goods "be labeled or that other precautionary
steps be taken to prevent customers from being misled as to the
source, just as it may protect businesses in the use of their trade-
marks, labels, or distinctive dress in the packaging of goods."
03
The facts in Compco were nearly identical and the Court
reached the same conclusion.' In addition, the Court cited the
Patent Clause of the Constitution as support for the federal policy
of free competition.' However, one statement in Compco was lat-
er interpreted to narrow the holding of the Sears/Compco decisions.
The Court noted that the district court had found the
plaintiff's lamp design could serve as a trademark. The plaintiff's
lamp had distinctive ribbing which allowed consumers to identify
the lamp with the plaintiff. In response to this fact, the Court
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 The plaintiff sued the defendant for patent infringement and unfair competition
for copying its lamp design. The district court held the design patent invalid but found
the defendant guilty of unfair competition. Compro, 234 U.S. at 235.
The Court's opinion in Compro analyzed the design of the lamp at issue in detail.
The plaintiff's lamp employed distinctive ribbing which the defendant copied. The district
court found this ribbing nonfunctional because other choices were available to meet the
functional needs of the product. Id. at 236. On this point, the Court noted:
That an article copied from an unpatented article could be made in some other
way, that the design is "nonfunctional" and not essential to the use of either
article, that the configuration of the article copied may have a "secondary mean-
ing" which identifies the maker to the trade, or that there may be "confusion"
among purchasers as to which article is which or as to who is the maker, may
be rele-ant evidence in applying a State's law requiring such precautions as
labeling; however, and regardless of the copier's motives, neither these facts nor
any others can furnish a basis for imposing liability for or prohibiting the actual
acts of copying and selling.
Id. at 238.
105 "To forbid copying would interfere with the federal policy, found in Art. I, § 8.
cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of allowing free ac-
cess to cop), whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain."
Id. at 237.
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stated: "But if the design is not entitled to a design patent or other
federal statutory protection, then it can be copied at will.""' Lower
courts have read "other statutory protection" to mean the federal
trademark act, which was subsequently interpreted to protect un-
patentable product designs under trademark law."7 Under this
reading, the Sears/Compco decisions have been applied only to state
law, evading the conflict between federal patent law and federal
trademark law.
E. Later Cases - The Narrowing of Sears and Compco
In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,"8 the Supreme Court considered the
doctrine of patent licensee estoppel and confronted a conflict be-
tween federal patent law and common law contract. Adkins, under
contract with Lear, Inc., developed a method for manufacturing
accurate gyroscopes. While Adkins' patent on the method was
pending, Adkins licensed the technology to Lear. However, Lear
terminated payments on the license and argued that the patent
was anticipated. After Lear stopped payments, Adkins' patent is-
sued. Adkins sued for his royalties.
Under the doctrine of licensee estoppel, Lear was estopped to
deny the validity of the licensed patent. In short, a licensee could
not refuse to pay royalties on the basis that the patent was not
valid because, under contract law, a purchaser may not repudiate
a bargain upon becoming dissatisfied with the bargain."° Patent
law, however, "requires that all ideas in general circulation be
dedicated to the common good unless they are protected by a
valid patent.""' By restricting challenges to the validity of pat-
ents, the public right to unpatentable ideas may be thwarted.
Finding that the demands of patent law supersede the common
law of contracts, the Court repudiated the doctrine of patent li-
censee estoppel."'
In Goldstein v. California,12 the Supreme Court considered
the preemptive effects of the federal copyright laws. The defen-
106 Id. at 238 (emphasis added).
107 See discussion infra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
108 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
109 Id. at 668.
110 Id.
11 See also Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Fstoppel and the Incentive to
Innovate, 72 VA. L. REv. 677 (1986).
112 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
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dants were convicted under California law of "pirating" musical
tape recordings. The defendants purchased commercial tapes or
records, copied them to tape, and sold them in competition with
the original artists. At the time the defendants were prosecuted,
federal copyright law did not protect sound recordings.' 3 The
defendants argued that Sears/Compco allowed them to copy any
work not protected by federal copyright.
The Court distinguished Sears/Compco. Under the patent laws,
the Court reasoned, Congress had carefilly balanced the need to
encourage invention against the freedom to copy certain articles.
This balance was struck according to the standards of patentability.
Those articles that did not meet the standards of patentability
were free for all to use. A state, by protecting articles that did not
meet these standards, upset the balance drawn by Congress."4
The California law, in contrast, did not create such a conflict
with federal copyright law because Congress had left sound record-
ings unregulated. At the time, sound recordings did not fall within
the subject matter of federal copyright. Since Congress had yet to
draw a balance between copyrightable and uncopyrightable sound
recordings, a state law did not pose a risk of upsetting this bal-
ance. Therefore, the federal copyright laws did not preempt the
California statute which protected sound recordings."'
In making this distinction, the Court differentiated the pre-
emptive effect of Congress's failure to protect specific subject mat-
ter and Congress's denial of protection based on specific quali-
tative criteria. Where, as in Goldstein, Congress had declined to
protect specific subject matter (sound recordings not copyright-
able), this congressional decision did not preempt state laws pro-
tecting the excluded subject matter. At the time of the Goldstein
decision, the subject matter of federal copyright was specifically
defined and strictly observed." 6 The California law covered sub-
ject matter that fell outside the enumerated list. Therefore, the
state was free to regulate the federally unregulated subject matter.
However, where Congress had affirmatively denied protection
113 In 1971, the Copyright Act was amended to include sound recordings created
after February 15, 1972. Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971); see also 17 U.S.C. §
102(a)(7) (1991) (including sound recordings in the subject matter of copyright). Howev-
er, the statute did not apply retroactively to sound recordings created before this date.
The defendants were prosecuted for record piracy occurring before February 15, 1972.
114 Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 569-70.
115 Id.
116 Prior to 1972, sound recordings were not copyrightable subject matter.
[Vol. 70:1
NOTE-PROTECTION OF PRODUCT DESIGNS
based on specific qualitative criteria (nonnovel and obvious articles
not patentable), this congressional decision did preempt state laws
protecting unworthy subject matter. The Goldstein Court character-
ized the issue in Sears/Compco as whether a state could protect
"mechanical configurations" that lacked the "qualities required" for
patent protection." 7  Although this reading narrowed
Sears/Compco,"8 the central holding of Sears/Compco was not dis-
puted. A state could not give patent-like protection to "an article
which lacked the level of invention required for federal patents."'1
The Court also noted that the durational limit in the Patent
and Copyright Clause of the Constitution was not a limit on state
action.'20 Although California had granted perpetual fights to
sound recordings, the Patent Clause limited only Congress's pow-
er.'1
2 1
In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Coip., 2- the Supreme Court con-
sidered the conflict between federal patent law and state trade
secret law. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant stole its secret
manufacturing process for growing large crystals. The defendants
were former employees of the plaintiff and had started a compet-
ing business. The district court, applying Ohio trade secret law,
117 Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 569.
118 In separate dissents, Justices Douglas and Marshall saw a clear conflict with the
policy announced in Sears/Conpco. Both acknowledged a retreat from the policy of free
competition in the absence of patent or copyright. Justice Douglas also stressed that the
need for national uniformity in intellectual property required preemption. Id. at 572-75.
Justice Marshall argued that Congress had exercised its full authority in the area and its
silence should be "taken to reflect a judgment that free competition should prevail." Id.
at 578.
Neither dissent acknowledged the distinction between subject matter and qualita-
tive criteria. "The dissenters' failure to acknowledge this distinction provided credibility to
the view that Goldstein and subsequent decisions largely reestablished the pre-Sears/Compco
balance between federal and state authority." Heald, supra note 1, at 973.
119 Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 569 (emphasis added) (quoting Sears, 376 U.S. at 231).
The Court's distinction between subject matter and qualitative criteria is sound. If
a state has protected equivalent subject matter with different qualitative criteria, the con-
flict is easier to determine. Also, Congressional intent is clearer ith regard to qualitative
criteria. Because Congress says that only nonobvious advances qualify for patent protec-
tion, one can imply that obious advances should not qualify for patent-like protection.
In contrast, although Congress says that products, processes, designs, and plants qualify
for patent protection, one cannot similarly conclude that other subject matter, such as
business methods, computer programs, or animals, should not be given patent-like protec-
tion. See Heald, supra note 1, at 974.
120 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing Congress power to grant patents and
copyrights "for limited Times").
121 Golstein, 412 U.S. at 560.
122 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
19941
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
found that the plaintiff's process was a legitimate trade secret and
enjoined the defendants from using or disclosing the secret pro-
cess. 123 The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the state trade
secret law was preempted by patent law. The court reasoned that
the state law protected patentable subject matter, a process, that
was ineligible for patent protection because it had been in use for
over one year.124
The Supreme Court reversed and held that patent law did not
preempt state trade secret law. The Court listed the purposes of
patent law and examined whether trade secret protection con-
flicted with each of those purposes. The Court stated that the
purposes of the patent laws were to: 1) encourage invention; 2)
encourage full disclosure of inventions; and 3) deny protection to
123 Ohio had adopted the Restatement definition of trade secrets. A trade secret may
be "any formula, pattern, device or compilation or information which is used in one's
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939); see also UNI-
FORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985).
To qualify as a trade secret, information must not be common knowledge in the
trade or business and it must not be easily ascertainable by proper means. Information
discovered through independent development or reverse engineering is not protected.
However, independent development does not deprive a trade secret of protection if other
knowledgeable parties are not too numerous and also keep the matter secret.
The secrecy requirement is not absolute. A trade secret may be disclosed to em-
ployees and licensees. However, the trade secret holder must make "reasonable efforts" to
keep the information secret. The adequacy of safeguards are judged on a case-by-case
basis and determined by the nature of the information to be protected and the conduct
of the parties. Typically, employees and licensees must sign nondisclosure agreements. See
USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener Corp., 393 N.E.2d 895, 902 (Mass. 1979). A trade secret
holder must also make reasonable efforts to prevent inadvertent disclosure and industrial
espionage. See E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir.
1970) (protecting plaintiffs trade secrets from aerial photography; plaintiff not required
to cover unfinished plant to protect against disclosure).
A trade secret must be commercially valuable information. A simple secret, that
offers no competitive business advantage, is not a trade secret. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986) (Church of Scientology's religious materials
not a trade secret), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1103 (1987).
Even if information qualifies as a trade secret, it must be improperly acquired, dis-
closed, or used before the conduct is actionable. This improper conduct is usually either
breach of a nondisclosure agreement or tortious conduct, such as a trespass or misrepre-
sentation, to obtain the secret. "In general they are means which fall below the generally
accepted standards of commercial morality and reasonable conduct." RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 757 cmt. f (1939). A trade secret holder is not protected if the information is
obtained through proper means such as reverse engineering. See Chicago Lock Co. v.
Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400, 405 (9th Cir. 1982) (reverse engineering of lock and publication
of serial number key codes not improper).
124 Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 474. A patent applicant must apply for a patent within
one year of the public use or sale of an invention. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1991). In the
case of a process, public use occurs upon sale of a product of the process.
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inventions already in the public domain. 12 5
First, the Court noted that trade secret protection of unpat-
entable subject matter, such as customer lists, does not conflict
with patent law. 126 Just like the sound recordings in Goldstein,
Congress had drawn no balance with regard to unpatentable infor-
mation. However, the crystal growing process was clearly patent-
able subject matter.
With regard to patentable subject matter, the Court found no
conflict with the policies of encouraging invention and denying
protection to items in the public domain. The patent policy of
encouraging invention was not disturbed by a second incentive to
invent. Also, by definition, trade secrets are not in the public
domain. Therefore, the patent policy of denying protection to
inventions in the public domain did not apply.1
2 7
However, the policy of encouraging disclosure posed greater
problems. If inventors opted for trade secret protection over pat-
ent protection, inventions would not be disclosed. To assess this
possibility, the Court divided potentially patentable trade secrets
into three categories: 1) a trade secret the inventor knows is not
patentable; 2) a trade secret the inventor believes may or may not
be patentable; and 3) a trade secret the inventor believes is pat-
entable.
In the first case, abolishing trade secrets would not lead to
disclosure of an invention the inventor knows is not patentable.
The inventor would still have no incentive to file a patent applica-
tion which would ultimately be rejected. Instead, trade secret laws
protect inventions that could not otherwise be exploited. An in-
ventor could not license a secret or efficiently work with employ-
ees if the licensee and employee could not be bound to secrecy.
Therefore, trade secret protection of inventions that do not meet
the standards of patentability offers a benefit without detracting
from the patent policy of disclosure.
2
1
In the second case, abolishing trade secrets might lead to
disclosure of inventions of doubtful patentability. However, many
disclosures would lead to rejection by the PTO. In these cases,
125 See id. at 480-81. The Court discussed the policies of promoting invention and
disclosure and then stated: "The Court has also articulated another policy of the patent
law: that which is in the public domain cannot be removed therefrom by action of the
States." Id. at 481.
126 Id. at 482-83.
127 Id. at 484.
128 Id. at 485-86.
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society would be temporarily denied the benefits of the licensing
of the invention. Also, even if a patent is granted, the patent
could ultimately be invalidated in court. Because of the problems
associated with patents of doubtful validity, the Court saw no rea-
son to encourage their disclosure.'29
In the third case, the Court struggled with the danger of
discouraging disclosure of clearly patentable inventions by allowing
trade secret protection. The Court noted that it would be com-
pelled to preempt the state law if it created a "substantial risk"
that inventors would not seek patents for patentable inven-
tions.' However, the Court found that trade secret law did not
create such a risk because of the limits of trade secret protection.
First, trade secret law does not protect against independent cre-
ation or reverse engineering. Second, a trade secret holder may be
unable to discover or prove theft of a trade secret or breach of a
confidentiality agreement. Therefore, because of these inadequa-
cies in trade secret protection, the possibility that the holder of a
patentable invention would forgo patent protection "is remote
indeed." 3' Because trade secret law was not a realistic alternative
129 Id. at 487-89.
130 Id. at 489.
131 Id. at 490. The Court gave little weight to a major advantage of trade secret pro-
tection over patent protection-perpetual protection. In apparent response to this benefit
of trade secrets, the Court noted that the "rare inventor" who chose trade secret protec-
tion would not likely impede technological progress. "The ripeness-of-time concept of
invention, developed from the stud) of the many independent multiple discoveries in
history, predicts that if a particular individual had not made a particular discovery others
would have, and in probably a relatively short period of time." Id.
Although the Court's holding was correct, its factual conclusions were flawed. Dis-
cussions with patent counsel reveal that the availability of trade secret protection does, in
fact, present a "substantial risk" that inventors will forgo patent protection. When advising
clients on a comprehensive plan for intellectual property protection, patent attorneys
outline the benefits, disadvantages, and costs of patent and trade secret protection. Inven-
tors routinely opt for trade secret protection over patent protection for obviously patent-
able processes. The primary reason for selecting trade secret protection is the fear of
disclosure upon patent expiration or that a patent will be declared invalid in litigation.
Consider the most famous trade secret-the formula and process for manufacturing
Coca-Cola. The Coca-Cola Co. has successfully protected its formula as a trade secret
since an Atlanta pharmacist first created Coca-Cola in 1886. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 563 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Del. 1983). Under present law, Coca-Cola
could have patented its process and probably the product. See Procter & Gamble Co. v.
Nabisco Brands, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 759 (D. Del. 1989) (considering the patentability of a
cookie that was "crispy on the outside and cheiy on the inside"). However, if Coca-Cola
had patented the process, it would have long ago passed into the public domain.
Despite the flaws in the Court's factual basis, the holding is correct. However, the
Court did not need to examine the potential conflicts between trade secret and patent
policy to reach this conclusion. Congress has implicitly, if not expressly, approved trade
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to patent protection, the Court found no conflict. 32
In Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 3 ' the Court held that
federal patent law did not preempt state enforcement of a licens-
ing agreement on an unpatentable article. Aronson invented a
novel keyholder and applied for a patent on the invention. During
prosecution of the patent, Aronson licensed Quick Point to manu-
facture the keyholder. The royalty agreement provided for reduced
royalty payments if the patent did not issue within five years. The
patent was ultimately rejected and Quick Point, after making re-
duced royalty payments for fourteen years, sued for a declaratory
judgment that enforcement of the agreement under state contract
law was preempted by federal patent law.'
The Court reiterated the patent policies listed in Kewanee and
found no conflict with these policies. Enforceable licensing agree-
ments both encouraged invention and promoted disclosure of the
invention. With regard to the patent policy against withdrawing
ideas from the public domain, the invention entered the public
domain when manufactured by the licensee. Competitors were free
to copy the invention. The agreement merely required the licens-
ee to pay for the competitive advantage of being the first to mar-
ket the invention."5
In Brulotte, the Court had held that state contract law could
not extend the life of a patent."'8 The patentee was forbidden
secret protection in the Patent Act. The Patent Act provides that patent applications are
"kept in confidence." 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1991). This provision allows an inventor to retain
an invention as a trade secret upon rejection or abandonment of the application. By not
mandating public disclosure, Congress has recognized the -alue of trade secrets. Justice
Marshall, in concurrence, makes the same point by noting that Congress has explicitly
protected trade secrets provided to federal agencies. Kewvanee Oi 416 U.S. at 494.
Judge Learned Hand recognized the mutually exclusive role of patents and trade
secrets when he stated: "[lit is a condition upon the inventor's right to a patent that he
shall not exploit his discovery competitively after it is ready for patenting- he must con-
tent himself with either secrecy or legal monopoly." Metallizing Eng'g Co. v. Kenyon
Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir.), men. denied, 328 U.S. 840 (1946);
see also U.S. v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1933) ("[An inventor]
may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely. In consideration of its dis-
closure and the consequent benefit to the community, the patent is granted.").
132 Justice Douglas again dissented and declared the Court's decision "at war with the
philosophy" of Sears/Conpco. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 495. Justice Douglas did not object
to adequate damages for breach of a secrecy agreement. However, an injunction against
future use of a trade secret was too patent-like to survive preemption. Id. at 498-99.
133 440 U.S. 257 (1979).
134 Id. at 259-60.
135 Id. at 262-63
136 See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
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from "leveraging" a patent monopoly beyond expiration. The
Aronson Court distinguished the decision because the royalty agree-
ment had provided for the possibility that a patent might not
issue. Although the patent application might provide greater bar-
gaining power, the application "played no part" in the reduced
royalty agreement.
137
In Lear, the Court had held that state contract law could not
be used to prevent challenges to the validity of a patent.3 Fur-
ther, a licensee that successfully challenged a patent was relieved
of liability for royalty payments. The Court feared that the public
rights in unpatentable ideas could be restricted. The Aronson
Court distinguished the decision because it rested on the policies
of encouraging challenges to invalid patents and of not with-
drawing unpatentable inventions from the public domain. "Accord-
ingly, neither the holding nor the rationale of Lear controls when
no patent has issued, and no ideas have been withdrawn from
public use."'3 9
F. Bonito Boats - The Rebirth of the Right to Copy
After Goldstein, Kezwanee Oil, and Aronson, the continued validity
of Sears/Compco was questionable. Certainly, the decisions eroded
the "federal policy . . .of allowing free access to copy whatever
the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public do-
main.""' Under Goldstein, states could prohibit the copying of
uncopyrightable subject matter and, by analogy, unpatentable
137 Aronson, 440 U.S. at 265. The result in Aronson seems clearly at odds with Brulotte.
The Court's distinction is one only of degree. Just as a patentee can leverage the patent
monopoly, a patent applicant can leverage the potential monopoly. Moreover, the parties
in Bldolle had contracted for rights that entered the public domain upon patent expira-
tion. The Brulotte Court held these rights were not negotiable, although only the licensee
was restricted. The parties in Aronson had contracted for rights that entered the public
domain upon patent rejection. The Aronson Court held these rights were negotiable be-
cause, although the licensee was restricted, the rights were sufficiently dedicated to the
public.
138 See supra text accompanying notes 108-111.
139 Aronson, 440 U.S. at 264. Lear is clearly not distinguishable on the basis of
whether ideas are withdrawn from public use. The public access is the same for an in,.tli-
dated patent and a rejected patent application on an invention in public use. Under
both, only the licensee is arguably restricted in the use of the invention. Otherwise, the
invention is in the public domain. Under Lear, a licensee may stop royalty payments on
an invalidated patent although only the licensee is restricted in its use. Under the rea-
soning of the Aronson Court, the invention would be sufficiently dedicated to public use
to enforce the original contract if it provided for the contingency that the patent might
be invalidated.
140 Compro, 234 U.S. at 237.
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subject matter. Kewanee and Aronson had extended this encroach-
ment on the Sears/Compco policy to patentable subject matter.
These decisions allowed state protection of patentable subject
matter if the protection did not conflict with the patent policies of
encouraging invention, promoting disclosure, and not removing
ideas from the public domain. However, despite their erosion, the
Supreme Court refused to discard. Sears/Compco.
In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,'41 the Court
acknowledged that Sears/Compco's "absolutist terms" could not be
read literally.' Certainly, all state protection of potentially pat-
entable subject matter was not preempted. However, the Court re-
stated and reaffirmed the central holding of Sears/Compco, that
"the efficient operation of the patent system depends upon sub-
stantially free trade in publicly known, unpatented design and
utilitarian conceptions."14
The Florida Supreme Court had struck down a Florida statute
which protected boat hull designs.' The Florida statute prohibit-
ed the copying of boat hull designs by the direct molding pro-
cess. " ' A divided Florida Supreme Court held that, under
Sears/Compco, the statute was preempted by the patent laws. In a
different case, the Federal Circuit had recently upheld a similar
California direct molding statute.4 6 The Federal Circuit found
no conflict with federal patent laws because the California statute
prohibited only one type of copying engaged in by "unscrupulous
competitors."'4 7 The Supreme Court affirmed the Florida Su-
preme Court's holding and expressly rejected the reasoning of the
Federal Circuit.
4 8
Most importantly, the Court reaffirmed the Sears/Conpco policy
of the right to copy. "From their inception, the federal patent laws
have embodied a careful balance between the need to promote
innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement
through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the
141 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
142 Id. at 154.
143 Id. at 156.
144 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 515 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1987).
145 The direct molding process, or plug molding, allows a competitor to copy an
existing product by creating a mold from the product itself. The existing product is used
to form a mold from which duplicates can be made. The direct molding process is the
most efficient method for duplicating a physical product. Id. at 163-64.
146 Interpart Corp. v. Italia, 777 F.2d 678 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
147 Id. at 685.
148 Bonito, 489 U.S. at 163.
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very lifeblood of a competitive economy."'4 9 The Court criticized
the Federal Circuit's characterization of imitators as "unscrupu-
lous."'' t5 Also, the Court repudiated the Federal Circuit's state-
ment that "the patent laws 'say nothing about the right to copy or
the right to use, they speak only in terms of the right to ex-
clude.""...
For almost 100 years it has been well established that in the
case of an expired patent, the federal patent laws do create a
federal right to "copy and to use." Sears and Compco extended
that rule to potentially patentable ideas which are fully exposed
to the public.
5 2
The Court drew a line at the public disclosure of an inven-
tion. Both Kewanee and Aronson had considered undisclosed inven-
tions. Therefore, state protection was acceptable. However, where
the invention was public, the patent laws guaranteed access to all.
[W]e have consistently reiterated the teaching of Sears and
Compco that ideas once placed before the public without the
protection of a valid patent are subject to appropriation with-
out significant restraint. . . . Both the novelty and the
nonobviousness requirements of federal patent law are
grounded in the notion that concepts within the public grasp,
or those so obvious that they readily could be, are the tools of
creation available to all. They provide the baseline of free com-
petition upon which the patent system's incentive to creative
effort depends. A state law that substantially interferes with the
enjoyment of an unpatented utilitarian or design conception
which has been freely disclosed by its author to the public at
large impermissibly contravenes the ultimate goal of public
disclosure and use which is the centerpiece of federal patent
policy.' -5
The Court also declared that national uniformity is a goal of
the federal patent laws. The Court feared that states might at-
tempt to protect local industries from outside competition. "Given
. . . the great power [intellectual] property has to cause harm to
the competitive policies which underlay the federal patent laws,
the demarcation of broad zones of public and private right is 'the
149 Id. at 146.
150 Id. at 164.
151 Interpain, 777 F.2d at 685 (citing Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Electric Storage
Battery Co., 405 F.2d 901, 902 n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1969)).
152 Bonito, 489 U.S. at 165.
153 Id. at 156-57.
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type of regulation that demands a uniform national rule.""5' 4
The Court viewed the direct molding statute as a form of
protection against unfair competition. However, the direct molding
statute exceeded the proper bounds of unfair competition law
because the statute was directed at protecting the product itself
and not protecting consumers from confusion.5 5 In making 'this
distinction, the Court offered some guidance on the proper scope
of unfair competition law as applied to product designs.
Unfair competition law is properly directed at protecting con-
sumers from confusion as to source. Absent confusion, the prod-
uct itself is not protected. The Court repeated Judge Learned
Hand's.statement of this distinction:
[T]he plaintiff has the right not to lose his customers through
false representations that those are his wares which in fact are
not, but he may not monopolize any design or pattern, howev-
er trifling. The defendant, on the other hand, may copy
plaintiff's goods slavishly down to the minutest detail: but he
may not represent himself as the plaintiff in their sale. 56
In contrast, the Florida statute was "aimed directly at preventing
the exploitation of the design and utilitarian conceptions embod-
ied in the product itself."'6 7 Thus, the Court clarified that trade
dress infringement requires a showing of a likelihood of confu-
sion.
The Court made clear that its decision did not entirely pre-
empt state unfair competition law. It reiterated the statement from
Sears that states may place "limited regulations" on product designs
in order to prevent consumer confusion.'58 Also, Congress has
given no indication that unfair competition law is inconsistent with
patent law. In fact, in section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, Congress
has "given federal recognition to many of the concerns that un-
derlie the state tort of unfair competition, and the application of
Sears and Compco to nonfunctional aspects of a product which have
been shown to identify source must take account of competing
federal policies in this regard."'59
154 Id. at 163 (citing Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 179 (1978)).
155 . at 157-58.
156 li. at 157 (citing Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 301
(2d Cir. 1917)).
157 Id. at 158.
158 Id. at 165.
159 Id. at 166. Commentators disagree on the meaning of this passage. See discussion
infra note 166.
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III. FEDERAL TRADE DRESS PROTECTION OF PRODUCT DESIGNS
CONFLICTS WITH FEDERAL PATENT LAW
The Supreme Court's patent preemption cases considered
conflicts between patent laws and various state laws. The Singer,
Kellogg, Sears, Compco, and Bonito Boats decisions considered state
laws that prohibited copying of unpatented articles. In every case,
the Supreme Court held that the state law impermissibly conflicted
with federal patent law. Federal unfair competition law does not
differ from state unfair competition law. If state trade dress protec-
tion of product designs conflicts with design patent law, federal
trade dress protection of product designs must also conflict with
design patent law.
Many courts have held that the patent preemption cases,
having considered only the intersection of state and federal law,
apply only to state law. 6' Therefore, because the Lanham Act is
coequal to the Patent Act, the federal patent policy declared in
Sears and Compco is irrelevant and product designs may be pro-
tected under section 43(a). These decisions are wrong.
The policy of the patent preemption cases may not be dis-
missed so easily. These cases adjudicated constitutional principles
that apply to all federal laws. For example, the Patent Clause lim-
its Congress's power to grant monopolies. Congress may grant
monopolies only for a limited time. Also, the right to copy un-
patented inventions is rooted in the Patent Clause. Accordingly,
the federal trademark and unfair competition law may conflict
with not only the coequal patent laws but also the Constitution.
Also, the patent preemption cases did not deal exclusively
with the interface between state and federal law. In Brulotte and
Lear, the Court struck down a patent licensing clause and the doc-
trine of patent licensee estoppel.'" Both of these were based on
the federal common law of contracts. Both were contract doctrines
that applied only to patents and were therefore adjudicable only
in federal court. Regardless, the policies of federal patent law
superseded the policies of federal common law contract.
Federal trademark law is no different from state trademark
law. The standards for federal and state trade dress infringement
160 See McCarthy, supra note 5. at § 7.25[41 (collecting cases).
161 See supra notes 91, 108 and accompanying text.
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claims are the same."2 The Lanham Act merely federalizes the
common law of trademarks and unfair competition. As applied to
product designs, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits "any
false designation of origin" that is "likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive." Courts have read into this general
prohibition all of the technical requirements for trademark protec-
tion of a product design. The doctrines of secondary mean-
ing/inherent distinctiveness, functionality, and the multifactor con-
fusion test are entirely judge-made and a product of the common
law. Because federal and state trademark law are the same, any
conflict between federal patent law and state trademark law must
also exist between federal patent law and federal trademark law.
Moreover, courts recognize the conflict between federal patent
and trademark law in the functionality doctrine. Under the doc-
trine, functional features of a product are not accorded trademark
status. The doctrine exists only to prevent conflict between the
coequal federal patent and trademark acts. The functionality doc-
trine "head[s] off a collision between section 43(a) [of the
Lanham Act] and patent law."'
63
There is no reason intrinsic to trademark law not to accord
these features trademark status. A functional feature may acquire
secondary meaning. For example, a particular type of metal roof
was held to have acquired secondary meaning." Consumers as-
sociated the design with the manufacturer. Regardless, the roof
design was functional and ineligible for trademark protection.
Similarly, a competitor may cause confusion by copying the func-
tional aspects of a product. For example, the similarity of two
stoves caused consumers to believe that two manufacturers were
affiliated.'" Regardless, this confusion was not actionable because
the stoves were functional.
162 See, e.g., Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1987):
The [state] common law of unfair competition in the context of trademarks and
tradenames is similar to the federal law of trademark infringement. Unfair acts
of a defendant are actionable when they damage a plaintiff's legitimate business.
Such damages are suffered when a rival adopts for his own goods a sign or
symbol in an apparent imitation of another's that would likely mislead prospec-
tive purchasers and the public as to the identity of the goods.
Id. at 148 (citations omitted).
163 W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 1985).
164 See Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 633 (3d
Cir. 1992).
165 See Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, 626 F.2d 193, 195 (1st Cir.
1980).
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In both cases, the functionality doctrine prevented a conflict
with utility patent law. Although functional features could serve to
identify the source of the goods, according such protection would
conflict with the patent policy of the right to copy unpatented
articles. Also, courts do not protect functional features because to
do so would grant patent monopoly rights without proof of novel-
ty and nonobviousness. It is clear, then, that the Patent Act and
the Lanham Act may conflict.
Courts often ignore the conflict between federal trademark
and patent law by relying on the statement in Compco that "if a
the design is not entitled to a design patent or other statutory pro-
tection, then it can be copied at will."' Courts interpret "other
statutory protection" to mean the Lanham Act. 67 This interpreta-
tion is wrong. If the Supreme Court meant "the Lanham Act," it
could have said "the Lanham Act." A more reasonable interpre-
tation of the phrase is that the Supreme Court simply acknowl-
edged that Congress could grant limited protection to product
designs that do not meet the standards of patentability, as it has
considered doing under the Copyright Act.
Clearly, federal patent and unfair competition law may con-
flict. The brief statement in Compco does not simply invalidate the
patent policies expressed elsewhere in the opinion.
Finally, based on the conflict, principles of statutory con-
struction require that federal patent law control federal trade dress
law."~ Federal patent law is a specifically defined statutory
scheme enacted under a specific clause of the Constitution (the
166 376 U.S. at 238 (emphasis added). Professor McCarthy has attached similar sig-
nificance to the sentence in Bonito Boats that stated:
Congress has thus given federal recognition to many of the concerns that un-
derlie the state tort of unfair competition, and the application of Sears and
Compco to nonfunctional aspects of a product which have been shown to identify
source must take account of competing federal policies in this regard.
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166 (1989). "Although not
stated with great clarity, this passage does indicate that the Supreme Court recognizes
that the.preemption rationale of Sears-Compro has no relevance to the use of Lanham Act
§ 43(a) as the vehicle to assert a federal claim for protection against product copying."
MCCARTHY, supra note 5, at § 7.25[4]. Others disagree. See John B. Pegram, Trademark
Protection of Product and Container Configtrations, 81 TRADEMARK REP. 1, 1 (1991) (arguing
that Bonito Boat's reference to § 43(a) "may reflect an unwillingness to accept the extent
to which design protection has been extended by lower courts in the name of that stat-
ute").
167 See, e.g., Ferrari s.p.a. Esercizio Fabriche Automobili E Corse v. Roberts, 944 F.2d
1235, 1241 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3028 (1992).
168 See Kohler v. Moen, 12 F.3d 632, 651 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
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Patent Clause). In contrast, federal trade dress law is a judicial
doctrine interpreting a general statutory section (section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act) enacted under a broad constitutional power
grant (the Commerce Clause). "Where there is no clear intention
otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a
general one, regardless of the priority of enactment. " " There-
fore, patent law prevents trade dress protection for unpatentable
product designs.
IV. THE CONFLICT IS NOT RESOLVED BY THE STANDARDS FOR
TRADE DRESS INFRINGEMENT
A. The Conflict between Trade Dress Protection of Product Designs and
Design Patent Law is not Resolved by the Functionality Doctrine
The functional features of a product design are not eligible
for trade dress protection. Courts acknowledge that trademark
protection of functional product designs would conflict with utility
patent law. The functionality doctrine prevents this conflict by
denying trademark protection to functional designs. The rationale
of Sears and Compco supports the functionality doctrine:
The purpose of the rule precluding trademark significance [for
functional features] is to prevent the grant of a perpetual mo-
nopoly to features which cannot be patented .... Products or
features which have not qualified for patent protection but
which are functional are in the public domain and are fair
game for imitation and copying.1
70
If trade dress protection of functional designs conflicts with
utility patent law, trade dress protection of nonfunctional designs
conflicts with design patent law. Although courts and commenta-
tors recognize the conflict between trademark protection of func-
tional designs and utility patent law, they fail to recognize the same
conflict between trademark protection of nonfunctional designs and
design patent law. 17' Utility patents protect the functional fea-
169 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974).
170 Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 1981).
171
[T]o the extent that there is any clash between the two systems, the competing
concerns can be reconciled by according protection only to nonfunctional fea-
tures. Since by definition these features do not contribute to the utility of the
product, but merely to its desirability, and since they do have the ability to
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tures of a product. Therefore, trade dress law may not protect
functional features. Design patents protect the nonfunctional fea-
tures of a product. Therefore, trade dress law should not protect
nonfunctional features.
There is no basis for distinguishing utility and design patents
for the purpose of granting trademark protection to design fea-
tures but not functional features. Both are created by and adminis-
tered under the same law. The standards of patentability apply to
both. "The provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions
shall apply to patents for designs, except as otherwise provid-
ed." 2 Both serve the same policy of encouraging invention.
The distinction between functional and nonfunctional features
for trademark purposes was made in Application of Honeywell,
Inc."3 The underlying reasoning for the distinction was seriously
flawed. In Honeywell, the court recognized trademark rights in a
round thermostat design. The thermostat had been the subject of
a design patent. Although the design patent had expired, the
court allowed the patentee to extend its patent rights indefinitely.
The court acknowledged that trademark law could not extend
monopoly rights in a utility patent. "IT]he acquisition of such
rights will not be allowed in view of the overriding public policy of
preventing their monopolization."' 7 1 However,
the public interest-protection from confusion, mistake, and
deception in the purchase of goods and services-must prevail
over any alleged extension of design patent rights, when a
trademark is non-functional and does in fact serve as a means
to distinguish the goods of the trademark owner from those of
others. 5
The court thus established a hierarchy of competing concerns, in
the following order of importance: 1) prevent monopolies in func-
tional features, 2) prevent consumer confusion, 3) prevent monop-
olies in design features.
identify the source of the product, they should be entitled to full federal protec-
tion.
Bauer, supra note 21, at 725 n.219. But see W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337
(7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.) ("[P]rovided that a defense of functionality is recognized,
there is no conflict with federal patent law, save possibly with [the design patent laws].").
172 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1991).
173 497 F.2d 1344 (C.C.P.A.), cer. denied, Dann v. Honeywell, Inc., 419 U.S. 1080
(1974).
174 Id. at 1348 (citation omitted).
175 Id.
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This hierarchy is clearly at odds with the Supreme Court's
decision in Sears. The Court specifically subordinated the trade-
mark policy of preventing consumer confusion to the patent policy
of allowing free competition in product designs.
Of course there could be 'confusion' as to who had manufac-
tured these nearly identical articles. But mere inability of the
public to tell twro identical articles apart is not enough to sup-
port an injunction against copying or an award of damages for
copying that which the federal patent laws permit to be cop-
ied.'"6
Moreover, the trademark policy of preventing consumer confusion
is adequately served by requiring labeling of products. Monopolies
in design features may be prevented while, at the same time, pre-
venting consumer confusion.
In addition, utility patents may not be placed on a higher
plane than design patents. Courts readily recognize that functional
features should not be monopolized absent a patent because func-
tional features are essential for competition. Competitors must
copy functional features in order to compete effectively. Product
designs are also essential to competition and must often be copied
to compete effectively.
For example, the design of the 1957 Cadillac was a huge
success because, for some reason, consumers loved its large tail
fins. 177 Competitors imitated the fins and cars with large tail fins
were soon common. Under present law, Cadillac could obtain a
trademark in the fins because the fins were certainly not function-
al."8 Then, without a patent, Cadillac would enjoy a monopoly
right and could prevent other firms from making cars with fins.
Competition in cars with fins would be eliminated.
The effect on consumers would be no different than if com-
petition was eliminated in cars with seat belts, power steering, or
automatic transmissions. Cadillac would enjoy a monopoly in cars
176 Sears, 376 U.S. at 232.
177 "The extension of copyright protection to the fins would not have the collateral
effect of granting Cadillac a monopoly in a technological innovation." Raymond M.
Polakovick, Should the Bauhaus be in the Cop)right Doghouse? Rethinking Conceptual Separabili,
64 U. COLO. L. REV. 871, 893-94 (1993). However, the extension of either copyright or
trade dress protection to the fins would have had the effect of granting Cadillac a mo-
nopoly in a design innovation.
178 See Ferrari s.p.a. Esercizio Fabriche Automobili E Corse v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235
(6th Cir. 1991) (recognizing trademark in the design of a Ferrari automobile), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 3028 (1992).
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with fins and could, accordingly, charge a monopoly price and
reap a monopoly profit. In the absence of trade dress rights, com-
petitors entered the market for cars with fins. Accordingly, con-
sumer demand was satisfied. In 1957, consumers wanted cars with
fins. Because trademark law was not available to stifle competition,
consumers got fins.
The replacement part market provides another useful exam-
ple. An original equipment manufacturer may not monopolize the
after market for a replacement part unless the part is patented.
Thus, independent companies may compete in the after-market
for replacement parts. However, if the product has a nonfunction-
al design, it may be trademarked and the after-market monopo-
lized. In Kohler v. Moen, 79 for example, the Seventh Circuit rec-
ognized trademark rights in the shape of Moen's faucets. Now,
only Moen may supply replacement faucets to consumers, such as
hotels, hospitals, and restaurants, who desire matching faucets. If
consumers want a Moen faucet, they are forced to also take a
Moen replacement. Competitors are foreclosed from the market
for replacement parts. Accordingly, Moen may sell its original
faucets below market price and recover the loss with monopoly
profits in the after-market.
Chrysler may not monopolize the after-market in any unpat-
ented functional car component, such as spark plugs. Alternative
suppliers may manufacture spark plugs and compete with Chrysler
when a Grand Cherokee's spark plugs need replacement. Under
the same reasoning, Moen should not be able to monopolize the
after-market in faucets.
Similarly, trademark protection of product designs allows a
manufacturer to leverage sales in aesthetically compatible products.
For example, Apple Computers markets Macintosh computers and
peripheral devices that share a common, aesthetically pleasing
design. Apple could produce a low priced computer that sets the
standard for technological innovation. Apple could then produce
overpriced keyboards, monitors, disk drives, printers, and mice. If
trademark rights are recognized in Apple's designs, a competitor is
impeded in the peripheral market. To avoid trade dress infringe-
ment, the competitor must design products that do not match
Apple's design. Apple's overpriced peripheral devices will enjoy a
competitive advantage because they match the low priced comput-
er. Therefore, under the guise of trade dress protection, Apple
179 12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993).
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could effectively tie the sales of its peripheral devices to its suc-
cessful computer."'
As these examples show, nonfunctional product designs are
essential to competition and a free economy. The functional-non-
functional distinction is meaningless from the standpoint of en-
couraging competition. Both the functional and nonfunctional
features of a product may contribute to a product's desirability.
B. The Conflict Between Trade Dress Protection of Product Designs and
Design Patent Law is not Resolved by the Requirements of Secondary
Meaning and Likelihood of Confusion
Many courts find no conflict because a trade dress plaintiff
must show secondary meaning and a likelihood of confusion:
[C]ourts that have considered the issue have concluded, rightly
in our view, that [the design patent laws do] not prevent the
enforcement of a common law trademark in a design feature.
The trademark owner has an indefinite term, it is true, but in
an infringement suit must also prove secondary meaning and
likelihood of confusion, which the owner of a design patent
need not do; there is therefore no necessary inconsistency
between the two modes of protection. '8'
Courts imply that a trade dress plaintiff must prove more than
a design patent plaintiff. A design patent plaintiff need not prove
that consumers are likely to confuse the patented design with the
accused design or that consumers associate the design with the
patentee. However, in many cases, neither must a trade dress
plaintiff.
Many courts have eliminated the secondary meaning require-
ment if a design is inherently distinctive. 82 Also, several circuits
have eliminated the requirement, or adopted a presumption, of
secondary meaning if intentional copying is shown."3 In these
cases, secondary meaning cannot serve to distinguish trade dress
protection from design patent protection because secondary
180 Of course, the same result will occur tinder patent law if each device is patented.
Apple does, in fact, obtain design patents on its products. However, the patent monopoly
and concomitant burden on competition are possible only if the products are worthy of
a government sponsored monopoly.
181 W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.).
182 See supra Part I.0.
183 Id.
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meaning need not be shown.
To prove infringement, a trade dress plaintiff must show that
the defendant's similar product is likely to cause confusion as to
the source of the products.Y14 Despite the similarity of products,
many courts hold that confusion is not possible if an imitator's
product is adequately labeled." 5 However, some courts eliminate
the confusion requirement by protecting a product's "good will"
absent confusion.' Other courts eliminate the requirement of
confusion entirely if intentional copying is shown. 7
The Sixth Circuit has eviscerated the confusion requirement
by expanding the scope of relevant confusion. Most courts analyze
only the confusion of current and potential customers of similar
products, and then only at the point of sale. In this group, a firm
can easily control confusion. However, in Ferrari s.p.a. Esercizio
Fabriche Automobili E Corse v. Roberts,"ss the Sixth Circuit expanded
the target group to include the public at large.
The accused infringer manufactured relatively inexpensive
replicas of Ferrari bodies that were sold as kits and mounted on
cheaper car frames. No purchasers were confused about the
source of the imitations. They did not believe they were actually
getting a Ferrari. In addition, the replicas displayed no Ferrari
markings. 'Regardless, the court found that confusion was likely.
The court noted that survey evidence showed that "members of
the public, not necessarily purchasers, were actually confused by
the similarity of the products. . . . [Trade dress] protection is not
184 See Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 521-22 (10th Cir. 1987).
185 See L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1132-34 (Fed. Cir.)
(labeling of imitation athletic shoes dispelled consumer confusion), ceil. denied, 114 S. Ct.
291 (1993); Litton Sys., Inc. v. 'Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
("the most common and effective means of apprising intending purchasers of the source
of goods is a prominent disclosure of the manufacturer's or trader's name [and when]
that is done, there is no basis for the charge of unfair competition"); Bose Corp. v.
Linear Design Labs, Inc., 467 F.2d 304, 309 (2d Cir. 1972) ("The presence of
[defendant's] name on the product goes far to eliminate confusion of origin" of similar
speakers).
186 See Osem Food Indus. Ltd. v. Sherwood Foods, Inc., 917 F.2d 161, 164-65 (4th
Cir. 1990) ("When a newcomer to the market copies a competitor's trade dress, its intent
must be to benefit from the goodwill of the competitor's customers by getting them to
believe that the new product is either the same, or originates from the same source as
the product whose trade dress was copied.").
187 See Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 618 F.2d 950, 954 (2d Cir.
1980) ("If there was intentional copying the second comer will be presumed to have
intended to create a confising similarity of appearance and will be presumed to have
succeeded); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 354 (9th Cir. 1979) (same).
188 944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3028 (1992).
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limited to confusion at the point of sale."'8 9
The court was obviously concerned with protecting Ferrari's
reputation and the exclusivity of its product. In other words, the
court protected Ferrari's good will in its car design. For most types
of trademarks, the protection of trademark good will absent con-
sumer confusion may be warranted. For example, Notre Dame has
established substantial good will in its trademarks "Notre Dame,"
the interlaced "ND" design, the leprechaun, and the slogan "Fight-
ing Irish." Consumers are clamoring to purchase these trademarks
on products such as shirts, posters, and hats. Competitors are
prevented from usurping Notre Dame's rights in these marks even
if confusion is not present.
Arguably, the shape of a Ferrari automobile is no different.
Consumers seek to affiliate themselves with the image and prestige
embodied in the Ferrari name and product design. Protection of
good will in a trademark is a legitimate goal of trademark law.
However, when a firm's good will in a product design obviates the
need to show consumer confusion, trademark law affords monopo-
ly rights in product designs. Trademark law then conflicts with the
purposes of patent law.
Also, although a design patent plaintiff need not show likely
confusion, the similarity of an accused design to the patented
design may prove infringement.' 0 However, in evaluating simi-
larity, courts consider whether "one design would be confused with
the other."'' Although not an express element of design patent
infringement, likelihood of consumer confusion is relevant for
determining infringement. Accordingly, the tests for trade dress
infringement and design patent infringement are, for all practical
purposes, equivalent.
In Compco, the Supreme Court determined that the secondary
meaning and likelihood of confusion requirements do not resolve
the conflict between design patent law and trade dress protection
of product designs:
[T]hat the configuration of the article copied may have "sec-
ondary meaning" which identifies the maker to the trade, or
that there may be "confusion" among purchasers as to which
article is which or as to who is the maker, may be relevant
189 Id. at 1245.
190 See supra Part I.D.
191 See L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1124 (Fed. Cir.)
(emphasis added), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993).
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evidence in applying a State's law requiring such precautions as
labeling; however, and regardless of the copier's motives, nei-
ther these nor any others can furnish a basis for imposing
liability for or prohibiting the actual acts of copying and sell-
ing. 
1 2
In addition, "[o]ne of the fundamental purposes behind the
Patent and Copyright Clauses of the Constitution was to promote
national uniformity in the realm of intellectual property."'93 To
"provide national uniformity in patent law," Congress created the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and vested it with exclu-
sive jurisdiction of all patent appeals. 9 4 Although the doctrines
of nonfunctionality, nonobviousness, and infringement are com-
plex, the Federal Circuit has added consistency in these areas of
design patent law.
Trademark protection of product designs, in contrast, is in-
consistent from circuit to circuit and wholly unpredictable. To
become a trademark, a product design must be nonfunctional and
have either acquired secondary meaning or be inherently distinc-
tive. To prove infringement, a trademark holder must show that a
similar design is likely to cause confusion. Each of these three
doctrines is unpredictable and applied inconsistently in different
federal circuits.
Because courts have difficulty determining if a design may
serve as trade dress, practitioners cannot offer reliable advice to a
firm that seeks to compete with a popular design. Since trademark
rights may vest under common law, a practitioner cannot deter-
mine which aspects of a design the competitor considers a trade-
mark. Also, it may be impossible, short of litigation, to determine
if the design has established secondary meaning. Finally, a
practitioner must consider not only the designs at issue, but also
the possible forums in which the action may be brought. Because
of the different tests under trademark law, a trade dress infringe-
ment action is particularly susceptible to forum shopping.
Under patent law, in contrast, rights arise when a patent is-
sues. A design patent issues only after a determination by the PTO
that the design is new, nonobvious, and nonfunctional. Although
these administrative decisions may be questioned in litigation, a
192 Compro, 376 U.S. at 238.
193 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989) (citing
THE FED.R.1-T No. 43, at 309 (B. Wright ed. 1961)).
194 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1); H.R. Rep. No. 97-312, p. 20 (1981).
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practitioner may review the reasoning and references relied on by
the PTO. In addition, a patent is presumed valid in litigation.95
Trade dress protection of product designs frustrates the na-
tional uniformity and predictability of intellectual property law. De-
sign patents facilitate predictability and, therefore, competition in
product designs. Trade dress rights breed litigation.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A. Reexamine the Standards for Design Patent Protection
In an effort to justify trade dress protection of product de-
signs, many commentators lament that the design patent laws are
ineffective in protecting product designs." 6 Commentators object
that the standards for patentability are too high, the costs and de-
lay are unacceptable, and design patents are rarely enforced.'97
However, the standards of patentability are essential for the opera-
tion of the patent system in a free economy.
The first objection, that the standards of patentability are too
high, strikes at the heart of patent law. A primary purpose of the
patent laws is to protect the public from monopoly. Only new and
nonobvious inventions or designs "promote progress" and warrant
the grant of a monopoly. Other purposes of design patent law are
to stimulate innovative designs and reward designers. A design
patent stimulates good design by allowing a designer to market a
product design free from competition for a limited time. The
economic rewards of a monopoly provide the incentive for invest-
ment in personnel or technology that produce quality designs.
The standards of patentability are fully consistent with these pur-
poses of design patent law.
Design is not encouraged for its own sake. Only innovative
design is encouraged and rewarded. The standards of patentability
recognize that there is no need to encourage commonplace de-
195 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1991).
196 See, e.g., Pegram, supra note 166, at 1 ("It is widely acknowledged that the
copyright and patent laws do not provide adequate protection for product designs . . .
."); Brown, supra note 56, at 1356 ("design patent remains a Cinderella who never goes
to the ball."); Thomas B. Lindgren, The Sanctity of the Design Patent: Illusion or Reality?
Twenty Years of Design Patent Litigation' Since Compco v. Day-Brite Lighting Inc. and Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 10 OKiA. Cml' U. L. RwV. 195 (1985).
197 "For most designs, standard of invention is too high, the time required to obtain
protection too long, and the expense and bother of doing so too great in view of the
probable returns." Jay Dratler, Jr., Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs, 1988 U. ILL.
L. REx'. 887, 891-95.
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signs. First, ordinary designs will be produced without encourage-
ment. After all, a product must have some design. The govern-
ment does not need to grant a reward for activity that will take
place without reward. 98 Second, the standards of patentability
deter unnecessary research costs. If a design is already disclosed in
a prior product, publication, or patent, a designer may be wasting
resources by independently developing the same design. Accord-
ingly, a designer should not be encouraged to expend resources
in developing a design that is already available. The novelty re-
quirement ensures that duplicative research is not rewarded.
The standards of patentability are essential to the operation of
the patent system within a free economy. However, the standards
of novelty and nonobviousness do not render the design patent
laws ineffective for protecting industrial design. Admittedly, a mis-
understanding of the nonobviousness requirement has led courts
to invalidate design patents in litigation on obviousness grounds.
However, the Federal Circuit, with exclusive jurisdiction over pat-
ent appeals, 199 continues to clarify the proper tests for patentabil-
ity and, consequently, strengthen the rights of design patent hold-
ers.
200
Some commentators have dismissed the effectiveness of design
patent protection at least partly based on an overly restrictive
understanding of the nonobviousness requirement. For example,
one commentator has stated: "In design patent law, the standard
of invention is what is nonobvious to a designer of ordinary skill.
Thus, by definition, design patent law excludes the product of the
ordinary designer's skill. '20' The test is not so simple nor so pre-
clusive.
In reality, the obviousness requirement is simply a means of
determining if a design is truly different from the prior art. When
applying for a design patent, the applicant must disclose all prior
198 Copyright law grants a monopoly on works of authorship with low qualitative stan-
dards. However, the type of monopoly provided under copyright law is less of a threat to
free competition.
199 In 1982, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit obtained exclusive jtrisdic-
tion over all patent infringement appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1993). Prior to this,
all patent appeals went to the various circuit courts. Due to the complexity of patent law,
many conflicting interpretations of patent validity and infringement developed prior to
these considerations. The Federal Circuit has greatly contributed to consistency in applica-
tion of the patent laws.
200 See In re Harvey, 12 F.3d 1061, 1064-65 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (reversing PTO deter-
mination that vase design was obvious).
201 Dratler, supra note 197, at 891-95.
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publications, products, or patents that are similar to the subject of
the design patent application. -0 2 The proposed design is then
compared to this "prior art.12 3 In addition, the commercial suc-
cess of the design may weigh in favor of patentability.24 For ex-
ample, the Federal Circuit recently considered the obviousness of
an athletic shoe design..2 -5 The design elements of the shoe in-
cluded mesh siding, a "delta wing" side, and a "mustache" back
ankle support, among others.2 0 All of the design elements were
disclosed in the prior art. However, the court concluded that the
prior art did not teach the shoe's particular combination of ele-
ments such that the combination would have been obvious to a
designer of ordinary skill. The court also noted that the commer-
cial success of the design and a competitor's copying of the design
contributed to a finding of nonobviousness. 27 The shoe was not
simply evaluated to determine if it was the work of the average
designer. Accordingly, the nonobviousness requirement is not as
great a hurdle to patentability as the detractors of design patents
assert.
The detractors of design patent protection also object that the
costs and delay of obtaining a design patent are prohibitive.0
The cost of obtaining a design patent may be several thousand
dollars and the time from filing to issuance is normally one to two
years. These costs and delays are also a necessary component of
the patent system. In contrast to a permissive registration system, a
design patent application must be reviewed by the PTO. This
review ensures that unnecessary monopolies are not granted and is
a further step toward protecting free competition. In most cases, a
few thousand dollars is not a prohibitive investment for a product
202 The duty to disclose all relevant prior art is known as the Duty of Candor. See 37
C.F.R. § 1.56 (1993). The penalty for failing to disclose material prior art is often invali-
dation of the patent. -
203 "Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined;
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the
level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obvious-
ness or nonobvious of the subject matter is determined." Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
204 "Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved
needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances sur-
rounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented." Id. at 17-18.
205 L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1124 (Fed. Cir.), ceil.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993).
206 Id. at 1123.
207 Id. at 1124.
208 See Brown, supra note 56, at 1356; Dratler, supra note 197, at 894.
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that, once patented, will return monopoly profits. However, the
costs may prevent some patentable designs from receiving protec-
tion. The costs may deter designers from applying for patents on
questionable designs. Also, individuals and small companies may
find the costs prohibitive. However, if these are truly problems, we
can expect the market to solve them. If a market solution is un-
workable, the government could establish subsidies for needy small
businesses and individuals to seek patents. A direct subsidy would
be preferable to scrapping an otherwise sound system. However, it
is doubtful that the costs of applying for a design patent are truly
a problem.
The delay in obtaining a design patent also does not render
the system ineffective. Although patent protection does not begin
until issuance, most competitors will be deterred from incurring
start up costs without an assurance of long term profit. If the
competitor can be enjoined from selling the product upon issue
of a patent, the competitor will not likely invest in copying and
manufacturing a product on which a patent is pending. Despite
any short term copying, the promise of long term monopoly prof-
its provides sufficient incentive for designers to obtain design pat-
ents. Some argue that design patents are ineffective in industries
with short or seasonal product life cycles.2 9 Admittedly, products
with short life spans receive less return in the form of monopoly
profits. However, such products offer greater returns for being the
first on the market. Any imitator must take time to copy, manufac-
ture, and distribute a product. The economic advantage of being
the first on the market is greater for a product with a ten month
life cycle than a product with a ten year life cycle. Accordingly,
design patent protection is probably unnecessary to stimulate cre-
ativity in these types of markets. The natural advantage of being
first on the market may be its own reward.
209 One commentator suggests that the delay may render design patents ineffective in
the furniture and luggage industries. Dratler, supra note 197, at 894 n.33. However, these
industries can and do obtain design patents. In the firniture industry, a LEXIS search of
the DESIGN patent file in the PATENT library reveals that 3,069 design patents were
awarded in the broad class of furniture (classification D06) from 1990 to May, 1994.
Although this number includes industrial fixtures, home furnishings comprised a consider-
able portion of the patents. For example, 41 design patents for sofas, couches, or love
seats were awarded; 51 design patents were awarded for dressers, and 145 patents were
awarded for beds. As for luggage, 112 design patents were awarded for luggage, suitcases,
and luggage accessories. During this period, Samsonite alone obtained 41 patents on its
luggage related designs. Obviously, someone believes that design patents are effective for
protecting these products.
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Further, the problems of costs and delay are also faced by
inventors seeking utility patents. These complaints are not unique
to design patents. However, unlike designs, functional products are
less likely to become obsolete in a short time period. Therefore,
functional products can potentially return greater profits in the
long run, making the costs and delay of obtaining a utility patent
worthwhile. This distinction between the functional and ornamen-
tal features of a product may support an expedited review process
for design patents. However, the distinction does not support
scrapping the review process. Product designs certainly deserve
protection. However, this protection must not be afforded to un-
worthy designs.
Finally, the detractors of design patents object that design
patents are rarely enforced. In one often cited statistic from the
years 1964 to 1983, courts invalidated 70% of design patents in
litigation. Of the 30% held valid, courts found less than half in-
fringed..2 " Alternatively stated, once a design patent is issued,
only about 10% are successfully enforced in an infringement suit.
Although this record appears dismal, the statistic says little about
the effectiveness of design patents. The vast majority of design
patents are never litigated.1 Most patented designs are simply
not copied and litigation never occurs. Accordingly, design pat-
ents, once obtained, offer effective protection to product designs.
Moreover, utility patents were also frequently invalidated in litiga-
tion during the same time period. The problem of invalidity in
litigation was not unique to design patents and was not an indi-
cation that design patents are ineffective overall. Regardless, the
Federal Circuit appears to have reversed this trend for both utility
and design patents. With regard to design patents, the court has
recently indicated its willingness to enforce design patents.2
Design patents are a viable means of protecting innovative
industrial designs. Design patents are obtained on products rang-
ing from shoes to computers. There is no crisis. However, the
proponents of design protection under copyright or trademark
principles basically advocate protection with little or no showing of
210 See Lindgren, supra note 196, at 209.
211 See Drater, supra note 197, at 893 n.28 (noting that from 1968 to 1977 less than
0.5% of all patents were litigated).
212 See, e.g., LA. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993).; Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp., 975 F.2d 815 (1992); Axia
Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear, Inc., 853 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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innovation. Lower standards would certainly lead to more designs
qualifying for protection. Arguably, the increased availability of
protection would lead to better designs. The guarantee of protec-
tion would offer greater incentive to invest in design and, conse-
quently, an increase in quality design. However, such a system
would come at too great a cost to society.
The forces advocating design protection without standards are
evidence of the potential cost of such a system. The primary pro-
ponents of lower standards are original equipment manufacturers
(OEMs). -13 OEMs face competition in the market for replace-
ment parts for their equipment. With a design patent on various
parts, this competition could be eliminated. On the other side,
insurance companies and consumers groups have fought the pro-
posed legislation. Insurance companies fear that expansive design
protection will lead to increased costs for automobile replacement
parts.-' This conflict reflects the true purpose behind lowering
the standards for design protection. OEMs do not seek greater
incentives for innovative design-they seek a government spon-
sored monopoly. Our design patent laws are inadequate only be-
cause they withhold that monopoly until a corresponding benefit
to society is shown.
B. Protect Product Designs under Copyright Law
Because of the standards of patentability, designers have
looked to the copyright laws for protection. The copyright laws
require little in the way of inventiveness. In contrast to patent law,
the criteria for copyright protection are minimal. A work of au-
thorship must merely be original and fixed in tangible form.1 5
Originality requires only a "modicum of creativity." 26 A work
need not be new or novel to be original. An author must simply
not copy from another to satisfy the originality requirement."'
213 See John J. Voortman, Curbing Aflennarket Monopolization, 19 J. LEcIS. 155, 155-57
(1993); Brown, supra note 56, at 1399.
214 See Dratler, supra note 197, at 906-08.
215 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1991).
216 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Sen,. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (finding
that compilation of names and phone numbers in alphabetical order lacked originality);
see also Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561 (constitutional requirement of a "writing" satisfied by
.any physical rendering of the fruits of creative, intellectual, or aesthetic labor).
217 As Judge Learned Hand stated: "if by some magic a man who had never known
it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an 'author,' and, if
he copyrighted it, others might not copy the poem, though they might of course copy
Keats's." Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
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Similarly, copyright is not available for discoveries because the
discovered work is not an original work of the finder. Also, a work
must be fixed in tangible form. Fixation may take any physical or
electronic form and requires only that a person be able to experi-
ence the work at a later time."8 Under these minimal require-
ments, a copyright professor's scribblings of a stickman are as
copyrightable as John Grisham's latest book.
I Copyright in a work "subsists from its creation."-1 9 A.
work need not be published or registered with the Copyright Of-
fice to be copyrighted.2 ' However, before enforcing a copyright
in an infringement suit, an author must register the copyright and
deposit copies of the work with the Library of Congress.22' Un-
like a patent application, a copyright application is not reviewed
qualitatively. Although the Copyright Office will deny registration
for obviously uncopyrightable material, the lower standards for
copyright allow permissive registration in most cases. The primary
purpose of the registration and deposit requirement is to facilitate
the Library of Congress's role as the repository of this nation's art
and literature.222
As presently applied, copyright does not protect industrial
design. The artistic elements of a useful article may be protected
"only if, and to the extent that . . . [the artistic elements] can be
identified separately from, and are capable of existing indepen-
dently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article."2 2 3 Under the sep-
arability doctrine, copyright may protect an element of a useful
article that separately qualifies as works of art. -4 For an industri-
al product, the ornamental features are usually not separable from
the product itself. In fact, successful designs intentionally combine
298 U.S. 669 (1936).
218 The fixation requirement excludes from protection extemporaneous speeches, acts,
or musical performances unless they are being simultaneously recorded. 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1991) (defining "'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression").
219 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1991). The 1909 Copyright Act distinguished published and un-
published works. Only published works" were eligible for federal copyright protection.
Common law protected unpublished works. The 1976 Copyright Act abolished common
law copyright in unpublished works by defining copyright as beginning from creation. See
also id. § 301(a) (preempting state copyright law).
220 Id. § 408(a).
221 Id. § 411.
222 See I PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 3.8 (1989).
223 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1991).
224 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 222, at § 2.5.3 ("Of the many fine lines that run
through the Copyright Act, none is more troublesome than the line between protectable
...works and unprotectable elements of industrial design.").
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form and function. Also, Congress has specifically stated that "al-
though the shape of an industrial product may be aesthetically
satisfying and valuable, the Committee's intention is not to offer it
copyright protection under the bill. -25
The copyright laws are ill suited for industrial design protec-
tion. Currently, a copyright poses little danger of monopoly. Un-
der copyright law, an artist receives a monopoly only in a particu-
lar expression of an idea. Although the first artist may have creat-
ed a market for the idea itself, other artists are free to express the
same idea in other ways and enter the market. The risk of monop-
oly is not present because the forms of expression are unlimited.
For example, Nirvana pioneered the modern idea of grunge
rock-harsh guitars, grating vocals, twentysomething angst.
However, they could copyright only their expression of this idea in
particular songs. Other groups, such as Pearl Jam and Stone Tem-
ple Pilots, and were free to enter this market with their individual
expressions of the same idea. Similarly, a copyright on an antitrust
treatise poses no danger of monopoly. Others are free to opine
on antitrust topics and compete for the dollars that consumers are
willing to spend on antitrust treatises.
In contrast, the protection of industrial designs under copy-
right law creates a great risk of monopoly. Once an idea is pio-
neered in a new design, the forms of its expression are limited.
For example, curved shapes for consumer products are popu-
lar .2" Everything from electronics to housewares are being manu-
factured with a curved shape. If one firm is allowed a copyright
on a curved VCR, for example, competitors will be foreclosed
from manufacturing a similar VCR. Of course, firms would be free
to sell differently curved VCRs. However, the functional demands
of a VCR constrain its potential designs. The designs that are both
curved and allow a device to record television programs are limit-
ed.
In copyright terms, the forms of expressing the idea of a
curved VCR are limited. Courts withhold copyright protection
225 Copyright Law Revision, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1976).
Proponents of design protection have attempted to amend the copyright laws to include
industrial design protection. These efforts have failed. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT,
PATENr, TR ADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCtrRINES 922-23 (1993) (detailing one legisla-
tive proposal).
226 See Gaile Robinson, Pandora's Box is Pass, L.A. TIMES, April 2, 1994, at NI (For
consumer products: "Curves are cool. Rectangles are square.").
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when an underlying idea may only be expressed in limited
ways.22 7 When an idea may only be expressed in a limited num-
ber of ways, the expression may not be protected without also
protecting the underlying idea. In other words, idea and expres-
sion merge. By withholding copyright protection upon the merger
of idea and expression, copyright law limits the danger of monop-
oly.
Of course, a VCR manufacturer that obtains a design patent
on a curved VCR would also eliminate competition. This is the
essential bargain of the patent laws. The copyright laws do not
embody such a bargain because the standards for copyrightability
are low. Instead, copyright freely grants individual monopolies
because the risk of market foreclosure is not present. However,
copyright protection is withheld when an underlying idea may only
be expressed in limited ways. For industrial designs, idea and ex-
pression would often merge and the dangers of monopoly are
great. Therefore, copyright protection for industrial designs is
inappropriate.
C. Embrace the Concept of Aesthetic Functionality
The doctrine of "aesthetic functionality" eliminates much of
the conflict between trade dress protection of product designs and
design patent law. The aesthetic functionality doctrine offers a
broadened concept of functionality that may encompass the orna-
mental features of a product. Utilitarian functionality precludes
trade dress protection for functional features and prevents conflict
with utility patent law. Similarly, aesthetic functionality precludes
protection for aesthetic features that must be copied to compete
effectively and, accordingly, may prevent some conflicts with design
patent law.
A nonutilitarian design can be considered functional under
the doctrine of aesthetic functionality. In Pagliero v. Wallace China
Co.,228 the Ninth Circuit refused to prohibit copying of the arbi-
trary designs on hotel china. The court adopted a broad definition
227 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 222, at § 2.3.2 (Merger of Idea and Expression);
Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) (bee shaped pin
not copyrightable; when "the 'idea' and its 'expression' are . . . inseparable, copying the
'expression' will not be barred, since protecting the 'expression' in such circumstances
would confer a monopoly of the 'idea' upon the copyright owner free of the conditions
and limitations imposed by the patent laws.").
228 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
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of functionality and, consequently, freedom of competition: "If the
particular feature is an important ingredient in the commercial
success of the product, the interest in free competition permits its
imitation in the absence of a patent or copyright. '29 The court
emphasized that the design on the china was its primary selling
advantage and was not adopted for the purposes of identification.
China "satisfies a demand for the aesthetic as well as for the utili-
tarian. '230 Since consumers demanded a particular design, imita-
tion of the design was necessary for free competition. The china
design was therefore functional. The doctrine advanced in Pagliero
came to be known as aesthetic functionality.
23'
Several circuits have rejected the doctrine of aesthetic func-
tionality and commentators, noting that the term is an oxymoron,
generally criticize the doctrine. 32 Professor McCarthy claims that
the majority of courts have rejected the doctrine and chronicles its
death in several circuits.233 However, such reports of its death are
greatly exaggerated.
In the Third Circuit, for example, the court expressly rejected
and criticized the aesthetic functionality doctrine.- The court
then went on to declare that the design of an outdoor lighting
fixture was functional because the design was architecturally com-
patible with the buildings on which it was mounted.235 The aes-
thetics, not the function, of the design dictated architectural com-
patibility.
2 6
Apparently adopting the concept of aesthetic functionality, the
Second Circuit has also refused to protect some aesthetic designs.
Using the Pagliero test, the court found the design of an Italian
sofa functional. 7  In Wallace International Silversmiths, Inc. v.
229 Id. at 343.
230 Id. at 344.
231 See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742, cmt. a (1938) ("Whlen goods are bought
largely for their aesthetic x'alue, their features may be functional because they definitely
contribute to that ,alue and thus aid the performance of an object for which the goods
are intended.").
232 See, e.g., Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 427 (5th
Cir. 1986); McCARTHI-, supra note 5, at § 7.26[5] ("The notion of 'aesthetic functionality'
is an unwarranted and illogical expansion of the functionality policy ... .
233 Id. at § 7.26[4] [b].
234 Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981).
235 Id. at 827.
236 See also Standard Terry Mills, Inc. v. Shen Mfg. Co., 803 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1986)
(patterns on kitchen towels found functional).
237 See Industria Arredamenti Fratelli Saporiti v. Charles Craig, Ltd., 725 F.2d 18 (2d
Cir. 1984).
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Godinger Silver Art Co., Inc., 038 the court rejected the Pagliero test
but endorsed another definition of aesthetic functionality.
"[W]here an ornamental feature is claimed as a trademark and
trademark protection would significantly hinder competition by
limiting the range of adequate alternative designs, the aesthetic
functionality doctrine denies such protection." 9 The court thus
adopted the aesthetic functionality doctrine on the condition that
protection of the design would hinder competition. Under this
test, the court refused to protect the plaintiffs baroque design on
silverware.
In Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc.,24 the Seventh Cir-
cuit apparently endorsed the concept of aesthetic functionality.
Using the same test as Wallace, the court vacated the lower court's
finding that the design of an exercise bicycle was nonfunctional.
The lower court "erred as a matter of law in not considering
whether the design and placement of the large front wheel was
aesthetically functional." '' The court emphasized that the "pleas-
ing" aspects of a design "may, at some point, become functional"
because the aesthetic features are "so important to the value of
the product to consumers that continued trademark protection
would deprive them of competitive alternatives."24 2 To prove that
an aesthetic design is functional, a defendant must show that the
design is "so attractive that trade dress protection deprives consum-
ers of competitive alternatives." 43 In other words, a design is
functional, even when aesthetic and nonutilitarian, so long as a
competitor must copy the design in order to compete in the mar-
ket that the original manufacturer created.
Despite some suggestions, aesthetic functionality will not elimi-
nate protection for all trademarks. 244 Admittedly, many trade-
marks are an "important ingredient in the commercial success" of
the product they mark. However, no one advocates the right to
copy every successful trademark in an effort to promote competi-
tion. The doctrine of aesthetic functionality is properly limited to
only product designs.
Although the term aesthetic functionality is an oxymoron, the
238 916 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991).
239 Id. at 81.
240 870 F.2d 1176, 1190 (7th Cir. 1989).
241 Id.
242 Id. at 1191.
243 Id.
244 See MCCARTHV, supra note 5, at § 7.26[5].
19941
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
doctrine is sound. The doctrine recognizes that a competitor may
need to copy a product's nonfunctional features as well as its
functional features. If product features must be recognized as
trademarks, the aesthetic functionality doctrine diminishes the
threat to free competition.
D. No Liability if a Firm Takes "Every Reasonable Means"
to Prevent Confusion
The protection of product designs under unfair competition
law has its place. As the Sears decision noted, courts may require
labeling of products to prevent confusion." 5 The labeling re-
quirement is consistent with the primary purpose of unfair com-
petition law-preventing consumer confusion. Moreover, a labeling
requirement would not threaten the right to copy. The right to
copy should be recognized, coupled only with an obligation to
avoid confusion through labeling.
To prevent trade dress law from exceeding its proper scope in
the protection of product designs, courts should scrutinize only an
imitator's efforts to label its product. The secondary mean-
ing/inherent distinctiveness, functionality, and likelihood of confu-
sion tests should be discarded for product designs. Instead, a court
should simply analyze whether an imitator has utilized "every rea-
sonable means"2 45 to avoid confusion.
To meet this requirement, a competitor that copies an unpat-
ented product must label its product. If a product is labeled, the
competitor should be free from liability under unfair competition
law. Normally, a competitor must place its name or trademark
directly on the product. However, adequate labeling will vary from
product to product. For products that are not suitable for direct
labeling, such as food, services, or aesthetically appealing products,
the competitor must label the packaging or provide full and accu-
rate information at the point of sale.
For example, the Supreme Court noted in Kellogg that a copi-
er could not directly label a shredded wheat biscuit. Since these
biscuits were served in restaurants, diners would be confused
about whose biscuit they received. Regardless, the Court found
that the imitator had adequately labeled its packaging. "The obli-
gation resting upon [the imitator] is not to insure that every pur-
4
245 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
246 See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 121 (1938).
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chaser will know it to be the maker but to use every reasonable
means to prevent confusion."247
This standard retains liability for firms that intentionally pass
off their goods as another's. The every reasonable means test will
also give predictability to this confused area of the law. If an imi-
tator labels, the imitator is safe from liability. To copy, the imita-
tor must simply labels its products. In most cases, firms already
label their products.
Under this test, courts would have no reason for distinguish-
ing between the functional and nonfunctional aspects of a prod-
uct. Both may be confusingly similar to another firm's trade dress.
Both may be labeled to prevent confusion. Accordingly, the manu-
facturer of a purely functional product should also utilize every
reasonable means to label products and avoid confusion.
VI. CONCLUSION
Industrial design is an important ingredient of our economy.
The design of a product contributes to its appeal and can be a
major factor in the commercial success of a product. We should
encourage and reward innovative design. To encourage innovative
design, we should grant designers the exclusive right to profit
from their innovative design for a limited term. Without this en-
couragement, society would be denied the benefits of quality de-
sign.
Fortunately, the means for protecting innovative designs are
in place. Design patents provide effective protection for the de-
signs of the vast majority of products. Manufacturers can and do
obtain design patents. In the vast majority of cases, these design
patents are respected and a firm is able to reap its rightful profits
from the design. Firms have found design-patents a wise invest-
ment for products including automobiles, computers, electronics,
shoes, luggage, kitchen utensils, and furniture, to name a few.
Admittedly, the PTO does not simply bestow a design patent
on every product that rolls off the assembly line. A product design
must meet certain standards before receiving a design patent.
These standards ensure that society reaps a corresponding benefit
when it grants a monopoly. That is only fair.
Although increased protection for designs could result from
lower standards, this protection is unwise. The proposals for copy-
247 Id. (emphasis added).
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right protection of industrial designs would award monopolies with
little or no showing of a corresponding benefit to society. The
current protection of industrial designs under trademark and un-
fair competition law produces the same effect. These systems im-
pose costs on society in the form of unnecessary monopolies.
Consumers are forced to pay higher prices for goods that would
otherwise sell at a competitive price.
The current protection of industrial designs under unfair
competition law is misguided. Courts have condemned copying as
an unethical business practice. Instead, and as the Supreme Court
has repeatedly stated, courts should recognize copying as a benefi-
cial practice that results in lower priced products and the in-
creased availability of goods to consumers. Copying should not be
blindly prohibited. Courts that prohibit copying product designs
run afoul of the Constitution and its mandate of free competition.
Courts should limit the application of unfair competition law
to product designs. If the present system is maintained, courts
should expand the functionality doctrine to include aesthetic func-
tionality. More significantly, courts should adopt the "every reason-
able means" test. If a firm copies a competitor's product, the firm
must only use all reasonable means to eliminate confusion. If the
firm refuses to label or intentionally passes off its goods as
another's, then a court should find liability. However, if the prod-
uct is adequately labeled, courts should find no liability. Only then
will the constitutional right to copy be realized.
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